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PREROGATIVE AND LEGISLATOR VETOES 
Elliot Louthen 
 
ABSTRACT—Prerogative is the devolution of power to a single legislator 
over decisions in her district. In cities with a prerogative regime, when the 
city council votes on an issue or an administrative agency makes a decision 
concerning a specific district, decision-makers defer to that district’s 
legislator. This deference gives the legislator exclusive executive authority 
over her district. In Chicago and Philadelphia, legislators have infamously 
wielded prerogative and tied the practice to corruption. But in addition to 
corruption, prerogative gives rise to another, more pernicious issue. When 
applied to decisions related to affordable housing, prerogative perpetuates 
racial segregation through legislator vetoes. Prerogative empowers 
legislators to unilaterally block the land use and financing approvals 
necessary to develop affordable housing in their districts. As legislators from 
wealthy districts block affordable housing through prerogative, affordable 
housing remains concentrated in racially isolated communities, thereby 
further entrenching existing patterns of housing segregation. 
Prerogative’s opponents have proposed legislative reform to curb the 
practice, but these proposals do not sufficiently account for political inertia: 
legislators are unlikely to curtail their own power. In the absence of 
legislative reform, housing advocates should turn to the courts. Judicial 
intervention can serve as the catalyst to effectuate land use reform that 
constrains prerogative and promotes equitably sited affordable housing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following Chicago’s 2019 municipal election, incoming mayor Lori 
Lightfoot marked her first day in office with ambitious executive action: 
curbing the influence of “aldermanic privilege.”1 The tradition of aldermanic 
privilege, also known as prerogative,2 refers to the power Chicago aldermen 
hold over city governmental actions in their respective wards.3 Prerogative 
enables aldermen to unilaterally approve or block decisions in their wards—
including permitting, licensing, and zoning—through an unwritten policy of 
deference that effectively gives aldermen sole decision-making power.4 
 
 1 Chi., Ill., Executive Order No. 2019-2 (May 20, 2019), 
https://chicityclerk.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/document_uploads/executive-order/2019/F2019-
93.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR3S-P3YH] (reforming aldermanic prerogative); see also Sara Freund, On Day 
One, Lori Lightfoot Takes Away Aldermen’s Ability to Block Development, CURBED CHI. (May 21, 2019, 
10:09 AM), https://chicago.curbed.com/2019/5/21/18633475/lori-lightfoot-chicago-mayor-alderman-
executive-order [https://perma.cc/K7XT-397A]. 
 2 See Chi., Ill., Executive Order No. 2019-2, supra note 1. 
 3 See generally Christopher Thale, Aldermanic Privilege, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI. (2005), 
http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/2197.html [https://perma.cc/W83Y-CET8] 
(overviewing aldermanic prerogative). 
 4 See Patrick Sisson, How Aldermanic Privilege Shaped Chicago, CURBED CHI. (May 31, 2019, 1:42 
PM), https://chicago.curbed.com/2019/5/31/18646174/chicago-politics-city-council-corruption-
aldermanic-privilege [https://perma.cc/LP5M-CZRH]. 
115:549 (2020) Prerogative and Legislator Vetoes 
551 
While proponents of the practice argue it fosters local accountability,5 it also 
creates opportunities for corruption given its discretionary nature. In the 
words of Lightfoot’s Executive Order, prerogative “undermine[s] the 
legitimacy of government in the eyes of the public.”6 
Lightfoot had campaigned on a pledge to reform prerogative,7 a critical 
issue sparked in part by the 2019 federal indictment of the longest-serving 
alderman in Chicago history,8 and her Executive Order sought a turning point 
in the city’s culture of corruption.9 The Order directed city administrative 
agencies to end their deference to aldermanic privilege as soon as 
practicable.10 But Mayor Lightfoot could not command the city council itself 
to change how its legislators honored an unwritten tradition.11 Thus, city 
council decisions over land use policies like zoning remained subject to 
aldermanic prerogative.12 
 
 5 For example, 35th Ward Alderman Carlos Ramirez-Rosa said, “I do think that there is some 
measure of accountability through the aldermanic prerogative system that we have because it demystifies 
the zoning process for local residents.” Tanvi Misra, How Chicago’s Aldermen Help Keep It Segregated, 
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/08/how-chicagos-
aldermen-help-keep-it-segregated/564983/ [https://perma.cc/YR4L-A6R3]; see also Bill Ruthhart, In 
Tribune Meeting, Lori Lightfoot and Toni Preckwinkle Clash over Power of Aldermen, City Hall 
Corruption, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/elections/ct-
met-chicago-mayors-race-lightfoot-preckwinkle-tribune-editorial-board-20190311-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LW6A-K2KA] (describing a mayoral candidate who argued that prerogative enables 
aldermen to better serve their constituents). 
 6 Chi., Ill., Executive Order No. 2019-2, supra note 1, at 1. 
 7 See Ruthhart, supra note 5. 
 8 For an overview of the indictment and Ed Burke’s historical power, see Chicago’s Political System 
Is Set Up to Produce Corruption, ECONOMIST (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.economist.com/united-
states/2019/01/12/chicagos-political-system-is-set-up-to-produce-corruption [https://perma.cc/D5PH-
FWYL]. 
 9 As the Chicago Tribune editorial board eloquently described it: “To put it in Chicagoese, Da new 
mare don’t like aldermanic privilege.” Editorial Board, Mayor Lightfoot and the Machine . . . Part 2: 
Aldermen, Limiting Your Privilege Will Help Fix City Hall, CHI. TRIB. (May 15, 2019, 5:00 PM) 
[hereinafter Editorial Board, Mayor Lightfoot and the Machine], 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-lightfoot-aldermanic-privilege-prerogative-
city-council-20190515-story.html [https://perma.cc/X2X9-ALWK] (describing Lightfoot’s Executive 
Order aimed at curtailing aldermanic prerogative). 
 10 Chi., Ill., Executive Order No. 2019-2, supra note 1, at 2. 
 11 See Sisson, supra note 4 (noting prerogative is “an unwritten law of Chicago political power, an 
unspoken privilege long abused by power brokers”). 
 12 See Claudia Morell, How Far Should Mayor Lightfoot Go to Curb Chicago Aldermen?, NPR (July 
1, 2019), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/07/01/737197413/how-far-should-mayor-lightfoot-go-to-
curb-chicago-aldermen [https://perma.cc/9ZWT-DKZM]. 
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While media coverage of Lightfoot’s Order described prerogative as a 
local matter,13 prerogative’s influence reaches much further. Cities across the 
country—from San Francisco to Nashville to New York—have grappled 
with prerogative’s hold on their respective decision-making processes.14 For 
example, like Chicago, Philadelphia’s own tradition of prerogative garnered 
significant political attention after federal prosecutors charged one of the 
city’s council members with wire fraud for extorting developers in 
connection with zoning.15 In Los Angeles, the growing homelessness crisis 
turned the spotlight on council members who exercised prerogative to block 
affordable housing developments.16 Thus, while Mayor Lightfoot sought to 
constrain prerogative’s influence in Chicago, prerogative’s impact stretches 
coast to coast. 
Despite Lightfoot’s Executive Order, nearly one year later, prerogative 
still reigns in Chicago.17 To Lightfoot’s credit, aldermen no longer have total 
discretionary control over certain administrative permitting processes such 
as those pertaining to bikeshare dock stations and landscaping requests.18 
But, especially as it relates to issues of housing development, prerogative’s 
grip on Chicago has only tightened: Lightfoot’s aldermanic allies have 
advised her that she would lose a city council vote to eliminate prerogative 
over zoning.19 Meanwhile, even the progressive, recently elected aldermen 
who most vocally support affordable housing have found prerogative’s 
unfettered power too alluring to give up, and they have used prerogative to 
 
 13 This is an understandable media angle given aldermanic prerogative’s roots in Chicago machine 
politics. See Sisson, supra note 4. 
 14 See infra Section I.C. 
 15 See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 121–126 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Brianna Kelly, Brendan Reilly on Aldermanic Privilege, Condo Deconversions and 
Development in the 42nd Ward, THE REAL DEAL (Dec. 20, 2019, 1:00 PM), 
https://therealdeal.com/chicago/2019/12/20/ald-brendan-reilly-on-aldermanic-privilege-condo-
deconversions-development-in-the-42nd-ward/ [https://perma.cc/3PZN-4722] (interviewing 42nd Ward 
Alderman Brendan Reilly on the viability of aldermanic privilege after Lightfoot’s Order). See generally 
CITY OF CHI., SIXTY-DAY REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 2019-2 (2019), 
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/Press%20Releases/2019/Augu
st/MLEL_SixtyDay_Rprt_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/93PV-TBSR] (detailing the findings and 
implementation of Lightfoot’s Executive Order on prerogative). 
 18 See Morell, supra note 12. 
 19 Fran Spielman, Lightfoot’s Most Powerful City Council Ally Urges Her to Abandon Threat to 
Abolish Aldermanic Prerogative over Zoning, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020, 2:37 PM), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-hall/2020/1/24/21080478/aldermanic-prerogative-zoning-lori-
lightfoot-lose-fight-scott-waguespack [https://perma.cc/35HF-EPNZ]. For a visual of prerogative’s 
impact on Chicago’s “splotchy” zoning pattern that “follows no larger logic,” see Emily Badger 
(@emilymbadger), TWITTER (June 18, 2019, 7:58 AM), https://twitter.com/emilymbadger/status/ 
1140967032000847874 [https://perma.cc/8R8N-JZ3B]. 
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further their own pro-affordable housing agendas.20 Consequently, local 
media have begun to spotlight prerogative’s impact on housing, rather than 
just focusing on prerogative’s traditional association with corruption.21 
This narrative shift is long overdue. The continued segregation of 
American cities remains a glaring civil rights issue today.22 This Note argues 
that the most pernicious aspect of aldermanic prerogative is its segregative 
impact. At its core, prerogative delegates control over development to a 
hyperlocal level, giving individual legislators total discretion over the 
construction of affordable housing in their districts. This tool of hyperlocal 
control, when coupled with constituencies that still mostly oppose affordable 
housing development in their midst, results in the consistent vetoing of such 
developments.23 These legislator vetoes prove particularly problematic 
because affordable housing is critical to communities of color24—a reality 
 
 20 See Alby Gallun, Progressive Aldermen Guard Their Privilege, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Dec. 6, 2019, 
3:37 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/progressive-aldermen-guard-their-privilege 
[https://perma.cc/B4F2-7LFH] (describing how Alderman Byron Sigcho-Lopez’s use of prerogative to 
demand a greater percentage of affordable units has “create[d] a dilemma for Lightfoot”); Heather 
Cherone, Controversial Plan to Turn Closed Humboldt School into Teacher-Focused Apartments Stalls 
Again, CHALKBEAT (Nov. 21, 2019, 12:51 PM), https://chalkbeat.org/posts/chicago/2019/11/21/plan-to-
turn-closed-humboldt-school-into-teacher-focused-apartments-stalls-again/ [https://perma.cc/ASZ8-
PJLF] (describing how Alderman Daniel La Spata wielded prerogative in November 2019 to block 
Chicago’s Plan Commission from voting on a redevelopment proposal because it was not sufficiently 
affordable); see also Misra, supra note 5 (reporting that Alderman Ramirez-Rosa has used prerogative to 
block redevelopment projects “to stave off displacement in his gentrifying neighborhood”). 
 21 See Sisson, supra note 4; see also, e.g., Editorial, A Great Way to Derail Progress on Affordable 
Housing, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Dec. 20, 2019, 2:49 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/opinion/great-
way-derail-progress-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc/V9GM-PEFB]. 
 22 Supreme Court cases on the desegregation of public schools, from Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
717, 721 (1974), to Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 709–10 (2007), starkly illustrate why housing patterns matter. For a searchable database exploring 
segregation’s persistence as recently as 2016, see Aaron Williams & Armand Emamdjomeh, America Is 
More Diverse than Ever—But Still Segregated, WASH. POST (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/segregation-us-cities/ 
[https://perma.cc/4QKU-TTDC]. See generally JOHN R. LOGAN & BRIAN J. STULTS, US2010 PROJECT, 
THE PERSISTENCE OF SEGREGATION IN THE METROPOLIS: NEW FINDINGS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 1 
(2011), https://s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/report2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DHN-
T8C4] (discussing the slow decline of segregation in the United States even through the decade of 2000–
2010, especially for Black Americans); Aldina Mesic, Lydia Franklin, Alex Cansever, Fiona Potter, 
Anika Sharma, Anita Knopov & Michael Siegel, The Relationship Between Structural Racism and Black-
White Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings at the State Level, 110 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 106 (2018) 
(finding that segregation correlates with racial disparities in police shootings). 
 23 See infra Section II.A. 
 24 Recent WBEZ reporting on private mortgage lending in Chicago summed up the issue: “The 
private market works in white communities. The private market does not work effectively in black 
communities . . . .” Linda Lutton, Andrew Fan & Alden Loury, Where Banks Don’t Lend, WBEZ CHI. 
(June 3, 2020), https://interactive.wbez.org/2020/banking/disparity/ [https://perma.cc/XS5L-L5E8] 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also ANDREW AURAND, DAN EMMANUEL, DANIEL THREET, INKA 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
554 
largely due to decades of deliberate government decision-making25—while 
opposition often forms in white, higher-income neighborhoods.26 
Consequently, developers rarely build affordable housing in the locations 
that might otherwise further economic and racial integration. Instead, as has 
traditionally been the case with public housing,27 affordable housing remains 
largely confined to neighborhoods that perpetuate cities’ segregated status 
quos. 
This Note focuses on legislator prerogative at the local level—building 
on the work of previous scholars who have discussed prerogative both 
exclusively28 and as part of broader arguments29—and provides the first 
comprehensive survey of prerogative’s national prevalence. This Note 
argues that judicial intervention is likely necessary to compel legislative 
reform that curbs prerogative’s segregative impact. 
Part I introduces the mechanics of legislator prerogative, describes its 
longstanding function in Chicago and Philadelphia, and surveys the national 
landscape to demonstrate its widespread nature. Part II discusses 
prerogative’s pernicious tendency to reinforce segregation through legislator 
vetoes of affordable housing developments. Part III describes existing ideas 
for legislative reform to curb prerogative and argues that these proposals fail 
to sufficiently address prerogative’s entrenched nature. Finally, Part IV 
offers judicial intervention as an alternative solution and discusses the scant 
case law involving legal challenges to prerogative. 
 
RAFI & DIANE YENTEL, NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION, THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF 
AFFORDABLE HOMES 13–17 (2020), https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-
Report_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/WVW5-VSLM] (breaking down affordabl- housing access by race). 
 25 For methodical expositions of government’s role in segregating cities across the country and why 
this still matters today, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW 
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 17, 30–37 (2017). 
 26 This antidevelopment resistance is frequently described as NIMBY, or “Not In My Backyard.” 
For a background primer on NIMBYism and its effect on affordable housing, see Corianne Payton Scally, 
The Nuances of NIMBY: Context and Perceptions of Affordable Rental Housing Development, 49 URB. 
AFFS. REV. 718, 721–23 (2012). Importantly, NIMBYism manifests itself in even the most “progressive” 
of cities. Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti aptly summarized this two-facedness: “If you keep saying, 
‘No, I’m for this in the abstract but I don’t want it here,’ or, ‘This isn’t the right location,’ or ‘I’m liberal 
but . . . ,’ then we’ll never solve the problem.” RANDY SHAW, GENERATION PRICED OUT: WHO GETS TO 
LIVE IN THE NEW URBAN AMERICA 60–61 (2018); see infra Section I.B. 
 27 See Scally, supra note 26, at 738–39. 
 28 See Kate Walz & Patricia Fron, The Color of Power: How Local Control over the Siting of 
Affordable Housing Shapes America, 12 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 1, 3 (2019). 
 29 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, 101 IOWA L. REV. 
91, 112–15 (2015) [hereinafter Hills & Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City] (arguing centralized, 
citywide planning would address the housing affordability crisis by, in part, solving the barriers posed by 
aldermanic prerogative). 
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I. PREROGATIVE’S REACH 
At a conceptual level, legislator prerogative is the devolution of power 
to a single legislator over decisions in her district.30 In a prerogative regime, 
this unilateral decision-making authority most frequently manifests in 
legislative deference—whenever the entire legislative body votes on an issue 
impacting a specific district, the body defers to the preference of the 
individual legislator representing that district.31 Though less common, some 
prerogative regimes also enable unilateral authority through administrative 
deference—municipal administrative agencies making district-specific 
decisions seek the opinion of that specific district’s legislator and defer 
accordingly.32 In essence, prerogative regimes transform a legislator from a 
representative within the broader polity into an executive of her district.33 
 
 30 Local legislator prerogative is conceptually akin to the former U.S. Senate practice of honoring 
judicial blue slips, where the home state senators could veto a federal judicial nominee by withholding 
their blue slips from the Senate Judiciary Committee Chair. Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and Senate 
Regular Order, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1, 1 (2018). Indeed, historical evidence suggests 
prerogative has roots in this appointments tradition. See Fraud Too Easy., CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 13, 
1886, at 1 (describing how “aldermanic courtesy” gave Chicago aldermen the privilege of selecting the 
judges of their own elections, where—given hypothetical Aldermen Smith and Brown—“Smith allowed 
Brown to select his own judges and clerks one year and Brown allowed Smith to select his judges the 
next year”); Two More Aldermen Brought In., CHI. TRIB., Mar. 27, 1892, at 4 (“As ‘Senatorial courtesy’ 
gives a Senator control over appointments in his State so does ‘Aldermanic courtesy’ give to the 
Alderman the profits arising from the sale of petty franchises within his own territory.”); J.H. 
HOLLANDER, THE FINANCIAL HISTORY OF BALTIMORE 239 (1899) (describing how prerogative in 
Baltimore “permitted the practical appointment of Commissioners by the representatives of the ward 
within which the vacancy occurred”); CITIZENS’ BUS. BUREAU OF MUN. RSCH., WHAT ABOUT ZONING? 
502–03 (1922) (“[I]n Philadelphia there has developed ‘councilmanic courtesy’ the full implication of 
which is that appointments from a certain ward or district are somehow subject to the visé of the 
councilman from that bailiwick.”). 
 31 See ED BACHRACH & AUSTIN BERG, THE NEW CHICAGO WAY: LESSONS FROM OTHER BIG CITIES 
20–21 (2019). Every city’s prerogative regime discussed in Part I features legislative deference save Los 
Angeles. 
 32 Id. Chicago’s prerogative regime notably features both legislative and administrative deference, 
while Los Angeles’ prerogative regime only featured administrative deference. For further context on Los 
Angeles’ practice, which has since been stricken, see infra notes 121–126 and accompanying text. 
 33 See David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1710–11 (2013) [hereinafter 
Schleicher, City Unplanning] (describing how a prerogative regime forces developers to lobby the local 
council member). Affecting the allocation of local power, municipal governance can take various 
structural forms, though the council–manager and mayor–council forms predominate. A key difference 
between these two systems is the separation of power, or lack thereof, between the legislative and 
executive branches, especially as it relates to administrative implementation. For more information on 
different types and configurations of local governments, see Benjamin Zimmermann, Does the Structure 
of Local Government Matter?, FELS INST. OF GOV’T, UNIV. OF PA. (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://www.fels.upenn.edu/recap/posts/1475 [https://perma.cc/4UJT-YDQJ]; Cities 101—Forms of 
Local Government, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nlc.org/resource/cities-101-
forms-of-local-government [https://perma.cc/JUZ2-82E9] (listing Chicago, Philadelphia, New York 
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In practice, legislator prerogative is hardly ever a formal element of the 
government’s structure; rather, it is almost universally an unwritten tradition 
grounded in historical use.34 The unwritten nature of these rules makes it 
difficult to discern when a legislative outcome or administrative decision is 
the result of prerogative,35 posing visibility problems for outside observers, 
including courts.36 In other words, differentiating between prerogative 
deference and a nonprerogative vote on the merits can be difficult.37 
Legislators employ prerogative most frequently in the land use 
decision-making process, either through regulatory approvals (such as 
zoning) or financing.38 Proponents of prerogative point to the normative 
benefits of granting outsized influence over land use decisions to the 
representatives of communities who feel the impact most directly,39 such as 
fostering greater accountability between constituents and representatives.40 
Prerogative may also reduce costs for developers by limiting the number of 
political actors they must lobby.41 Opponents most commonly point to its 
 
City, Baltimore, Nashville, San Francisco, and Los Angeles as all employing the mayor–council form of 
local government). 
 34 Every example in Part I save Los Angeles exemplifies unwritten prerogative. 
 35 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PHILADELPHIA’S COUNCILMANIC PREROGATIVE: HOW IT WORKS AND 
WHY IT MATTERS 2 (2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/08/philadelphia-
councilmanic-report--with-disclaimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UK9-5UT6] (describing the difficulties of 
recognizing prerogative because it “happens behind the scenes”). 
 36 See infra Section I.A. 
 37 Cf. In re Hudson, No. 24-C-17-004307, slip op. at 1, 100 (Balt. City Cir. Ct. Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/sfdev-bucket/rolandpark/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Memo-Opinion-
Overlook-at-Roland-Park-12.20.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SNN-D48M] (“The record shows one 
Councilmember giving a high degree, but not absolute deference to the sponsoring Councilmember. It 
also shows other Councilmembers either grappling with the issues or voting without explicit explanations 
of their reasoning.”). 
 38 See infra Section I.A. 
 39 See, e.g., Alan Greenblatt, In Wake of Scandals, 2 Major Cities May Curb Politicians’ Power, 
GOVERNING (May 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-chicago-philadelphia-
corruption.html [https://perma.cc/R6F5-JH8Y] (pointing to the efficiency argument for prerogative when 
the entire city council does not have to deal with minor district-level issues); PEW CHARITABLE TRS., 
supra note 35, at 2 (noting prerogative can lead to development “more suitable for the neighborhood”). 
 40 See Misra, supra note 5. 
 41 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 
86 YALE L.J. 385, 408 n.60 (1977) (“One cannot be certain, a priori, if this [prerogative] system promotes 
‘influence’ or ‘majoritarian’ control. On the one hand, it reduces homeowners’ organization costs by, in 
effect, reducing the size of the political unit; on the other hand, it lowers the administrative cost to 
developers of acquiring influence by limiting the number of political decisionmakers who must be 
approached.”); Nate Rau & Joey Garrison, As Development Booms, Nashville Council Goes Against 
Planners More Often, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 21, 2017, 5:12 PM), 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2017/01/21/development-booms-nashville-council-
goes-against-planners-more-often/96585874/ [https://perma.cc/3ML6-SQ58] (quoting a local land use 
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potential for corruption, highlighting criminal convictions of city legislators 
based on the political clout enabled by prerogative.42 But above all, the 
debate over prerogative reflects the tension between citywide interests and 
parochial preferences.  
The following Sections describe traditions of legislator prerogative in 
cities across the country. The first two Sections focus on Chicago and 
Philadelphia, as they are the two cities with the most high-profile legacies of 
prerogative.43 The third Section reviews prerogative in other cities to 
demonstrate its nationwide scope. 
A. Chicago 
Chicago’s tradition of prerogative, locally known as “aldermanic 
privilege,” is likely the most visible example nationally, in part because of 
the large size of the Chicago City Council. Whereas local legislators in New 
York and Los Angeles respectively represent 166,000 and 264,600 residents 
each, Chicago’s fifty aldermen represent wards with only 54,000 residents.44 
This council size further enables prerogative’s parochialism, where the 
legislature defers to the local alderman in the name of local accountability.45 
 
attorney who argued prerogative “give[s] developers a single point of contact to work with the 
community”). 
 42 See, e.g., Greenblatt, supra note 39 (reporting how prerogative enables “sweetheart deals” where 
legislators “ensur[e] that their friends and campaign contributors get more than their share of the 
development action”); Austin Berg, Prohibition, Prostitution and Chicago’s Mini-Fiefdoms, ILL. POL’Y 
(July 1, 2016), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/crony-chronicles-aldermanic-privilege-prohibition-
prostitution-and-chicagos-mini-fiefdoms [https://perma.cc/9WJY-V8MQ] (pointing to the political clout 
enabled by prerogative as “one root cause of Chicago corruption”); Claire Bushey, Chicago Aldermen 
Might Be Even More Powerful than You Think, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Jan. 30, 2019, 12:03 PM), 
https://www.chicagobusiness.com/government/chicago-aldermen-might-be-even-more-powerful-you-
think [https://perma.cc/DFW7-9TSM] (describing aldermanic convictions arising from prerogative-
enabled extortion). 
 43 See, e.g., Greenblatt, supra note 39 (describing the political impact of high-profile indictments in 
Chicago and Philadelphia on prerogative). 
 44 For a history of Chicago’s move to a fifty-ward single-district system, see Peter W. Colby & Paul 
Michael Green, The Consolidation of Clout: The Vote Power of Chicago Democrats from Cermak to 
Bilandic, ILL. ISSUES (Feb. 1979), https://www.lib.niu.edu/1979/ii790211.html [https://perma.cc/EYZ7-
2TS3]. For a discussion of the potential democratic responsiveness due to smaller ward size, see Sisson, 
supra note 4, arguing: “In theory, the extremely low ratio of residents-to-representatives on Chicago’s 
City Council promotes diversity, and allows for greater responsiveness to local neighborhood needs. 
Chicago aldermen represent roughly 54,000 residents each, where as representatives in New York (one 
for every 166,600 residents) and Los Angeles (one for every 264,600 residents) have much greater 
constituencies.” 
 45 See Alex Keefe, Pregnancy Tests? Pigeon Poo? What Chicago Aldermen Really Do, WBEZ 
CURIOUS CITY (June 11, 2013, 5:21 PM), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/pregnancy-tests-
pigeon-poo-what-chicago-aldermen-really-do/4d099e24-9b47-4b9d-8d39-fbbc92d379c0 
[https://perma.cc/WZR7-TWJY] (noting Chicago’s comparatively small constituency size per alderman 
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As one alderman recently opined, “I often liken the City of Chicago [to] a 
feudal system, where the mayor is sort of a de facto king. . . . And each 
alderman is the lord . . . of their individual fiefdom.”46 Chicago’s version of 
legislator prerogative is so ingrained in the city’s political culture that even 
city administrative agencies defer to aldermanic requests.47 Some 
commentators have called the practice “sacrosanct,”48 while others have 
likened it to “virtual dictatorial power.”49 
The local power of Chicago’s aldermen dates back to the city’s 
founding in the mid-nineteenth century,50 when aldermen served as “trustees 
of the ‘private affairs’ of their propertied constituents,”51 elected to ensure 
the passage of public improvement projects through special assessments.52 
 
enables aldermen to “micro-manage their wards”). A ProPublica investigation found that more than 90% 
of Chicago ordinances from 2011 to 2018 were hyperlocal in nature, rather than pertaining to citywide 
issues. Mick Dumke, At Chicago City Hall, the Legislative Branch Rarely Does Much Legislating, 
PROPUBLICA ILL. (Feb. 25, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/chicago-city-council-
aldermen-legislation-analysis-mayor-rahm-emanuel [https://perma.cc/5LFK-H2CZ]. In the words of 
44th Ward Alderman Tom Tunney, “Take away the zoning power of the alderman in his or her 
community, that’s not good. I don’t think it’s good because this building [City Hall] doesn’t know what’s 
going on in 50 wards, you know?” Morell, supra note 12 (alteration in original).  
 46 Keefe, supra note 45 (alteration in original); see also Anthony Todd, Cock Block: Chicago 
Alderman Blocks Opening of Chick-Fil-A in His Ward, CHICAGOIST (July 25, 2012, 3:10 PM), 
https://chicagoist.com/2012/07/25/alderman_blocks_logan_square_chick-.php [https://perma.cc/Q7J5-
FWED] (describing the use of aldermanic prerogative as a form of political protest rather than as 
boycotting business development). 
 47 See Thale, supra note 3; John J. Betancur & Douglas C. Gills, Community Development in 
Chicago: From Harold Washington to Richard M. Daley, 594 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 92, 
99 (2004) (“Aldermen have gained so much power in their respective wards that no public action takes 
place there without their consent.”). 
 48 Edward McClelland, Shutting Down Lincoln Yards Was Aldermanic Privilege at Its Finest, CHI. 
MAG. (Jan. 15, 2019), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/January-2019/Shutting-Down-Lincoln-
Yards-Was-Aldermanic-Privilege-at-its-Finest/ [https://perma.cc/P73M-MCS2]. 
 49 Patrick T. Reardon & William Gaines, Council of Favors, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1997 (§ 1), at 9. 
 50 The earliest mention of aldermanic prerogative in the Chicago Tribune occurred in 1876, where 
the paper noted the city council had rejected a candidate for Bridewell (Chicago’s city prison) 
Commissioner because “Aldermanic ‘prerogative’ was infringed upon.” Political Notes, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 
25, 1876, at 6. Throughout the late nineteenth century, prerogative in Chicago was frequently referred to 
as “aldermanic courtesy.” See Fraud Too Easy., supra note 30; Two More Aldermen Brought In., supra 
note 30; Repealing Special Assessments, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 1893; Result of “Aldermanic Courtesy,” 
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 4, 1892. 
 51 ROBIN L. EINHORN, PROPERTY RULES: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN CHICAGO, 1833–1872, at 90 
(1991). This concept was known as segmentation, where Chicagoans at the time “demand[ed] that their 
government represent property interests organized on a segmented basis” and insisted “there was no such 
thing as a public interest that city government could pursue citywide.” Id. at 144. See generally Thale, 
supra note 3 (describing the history of aldermanic privilege in Chicago). 
 52 EINHORN, supra note 51, at 86–87; see also Repealing Special Assessments, supra note 50, at 28 
(describing how special assessments were subject to aldermanic courtesy “[w]hen an improvement is 
confined to one ward and the Aldermen therefrom ask for the passage of a repealing ordinance”). 
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By the 1890s, aldermen also commanded the power to revoke liquor licenses 
in their wards and controlled the appointment of election judges in their own 
districts.53 Over the following decades, prerogative grew to encompass land 
use decisions affecting individual wards, such as zoning changes, sign 
permits, and landscaping requests.54 Despite this far-reaching power, 
aldermanic privilege in Chicago has no textual grounding in the city’s 
Code,55 and courts have only recently started to formally acknowledge its 
existence.56 
The public has long recognized prerogative’s influence,57 and nonprofit 
reports have also called for reform in Chicago.58 Unchecked, prerogative 
lends itself to corruption in a city and state already infamous as models of 
poor governance.59 In 2018, the editorial board of the Chicago Tribune 
published a stark condemnation of aldermanic privilege, calling out 
aldermen for enabling abuse by blindly affirming the preferences of their 
 
 53 See Sisson, supra note 4; Two More Aldermen Brought In., supra note 30. 
 54 See Sisson, supra note 4; Bushey, supra note 42 (“At least 11 of these day-to-day municipal tasks 
require aldermanic approval, notice or a council ordinance . . . .”). See generally Yue Zhang, Boundaries 
of Power: Politics of Urban Preservation in Two Chicago Neighborhoods, 47 URB. AFFS. REV. 511, 517–
22 (2011) (summarizing aldermanic prerogative’s development throughout the twentieth century). 
 55 See Keefe, supra note 45. 
 56 See infra Section I.A. 
 57 For example, in 2008 the Chicago Tribune ran an eight-part series investigating aldermanic 
prerogative’s wide grip on the city. Neighborhoods for Sale, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 21, 2015, 1:31 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/chi-zoning-storygallery-storygallery.html 
[https://perma.cc/7SDS-D27E]; see also Result of “Aldermanic Courtesy,” supra note 50, at 2 
(“‘Aldermanic courtesy’ is, briefly, reciprocity; it’s you help me and I’ll help you.”); Traffic Control, 
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 23, 1956, at 16 (arguing for a city ordinance that would shift traffic-control powers 
away from aldermen in part because “[a]ldermanic privilege has divided the city into 50 communities, in 
which local convenience and prejudices will always be given priority over the needs of the city as a 
whole”); Manuel Galvan, Proposed Zoning Revamp Takes Aim at Aldermen, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29, 1987, 
at B1 (describing a proposed zoning ordinance where sponsor Alderman Danny Davis, who is now a 
Member of Congress, argued the ordinance would “diminish the possibility of abuse of aldermanic 
privilege”). 
 58 See, e.g., THE CIVIC FED’N, FINANCIAL CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT CHICAGO MAYOR AND CITY 
COUNCIL: OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 63–64 (2019), 
https://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/chicagofiscalchallenges2019_full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U4N6-CNEV]; CHI. AREA FAIR HOUS. ALL., A CITY FRAGMENTED: HOW RACE, 
POWER, AND ALDERMANIC PREROGATIVE SHAPE CHICAGO’S NEIGHBORHOODS 3 (2018). 
 59 Between 1976 and 2018, there have been 1,750 public corruption convictions in the Northern 
District of Illinois alone. DICK SIMPSON, THOMAS J. GRADEL, MICHAEL DIRKSEN & MARCO ROSAIRE 
ROSSI, UNIV. ILL. AT CHI., DEP’T POL. SCI., ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NO. 12, CHICAGO STILL THE 
CORRUPTION CAPITAL 2 (2020), https://pols.uic.edu/wp-zontent/uploads/sites/273/2020/02/ 
Corruption.Rpt_12.Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/WGN2-SVCY]; see also Chris Bentley & Jeremy 
Hobson, How Chicago Politics Produced a Deeply Entrenched Culture of Corruption, WBUR (Feb. 28, 
2019), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2019/02/28/chicago-politics-corruption [https://perma.cc/ 
PP7T-FEJL]. 
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colleagues.60 The editorial board of Crain’s Chicago Business similarly 
identified aldermanic privilege as “a toxin infecting Chicago’s body 
politic.”61 But Mayor Lightfoot’s reform efforts will likely still prove 
difficult to enact because even progressive aldermen elected alongside her 
“have discovered how to flex their muscles” through prerogative in pursuit 
of their own agendas.62 Despite recent calls for reform, aldermanic privilege 
remains alive and well, demonstrating the difficulties of unrooting 
prerogative.63 
B. Philadelphia 
Philadelphia’s practice of legislator prerogative, known locally as 
“councilmanic prerogative,” is closest to Chicago’s in terms of notoriety.64 
Philadelphia’s city council consists of ten members elected by district and 
seven members elected at-large.65 When it comes to land use decisions 
requiring full council votes, such as sale of city lots and zoning, the district-
based legislators wield prerogative power—the rest of the council will defer 
to the decision of the council member where the land use decision is 
situated.66 A Pew report on prerogative in Philadelphia summarized the 
tradition as “I won’t mess with your turf if you won’t mess with mine.”67 Just 
like Chicago, the practice is unwritten—nothing in the city charter or state 
law mentions prerogative or definitively gives council members unilateral 
 
 60 Editorial Board, Aldermanic Privilege Run Amok, CHI. TRIB. (July 13, 2018, 2:55 PM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-aldermanic-prerogative-privilege-affordable-
housing-chicago-20180711-story.html [https://perma.cc/SW5G-LHP6]. 
 61 Editorial, A Great Way to Derail Progress on Affordable Housing, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Dec. 20, 
2019, 2:49 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/opinion/great-way-derail-progress-affordable-
housing [https://perma.cc/7R7P-B5RZ]. 
 62 Id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (overviewing examples of progressive aldermen 
wielding prerogative). 
 63 See Heather Cherone, At 6-Month Mark, Lightfoot’s Effort to Scale Back Aldermanic Prerogative 
a Work in Progress, DAILY LINE (Nov. 20, 2019), https://thedailyline.net/chicago/11/20/2019/at-6-
month-mark-lightfoots-effort-to-scale-back-aldermanic-prerogative-a-work-in-progress/ 
[https://perma.cc/3DKZ-ATLU] (acknowledging that Lightfoot’s Executive Order did not strike “at the 
heart” of prerogative). 
 64 See Greenblatt, supra note 39 (“In both Chicago and Philadelphia, members of the city council are 
facing criminal charges that stem from development decisions.”). 
 65 How Is the City of Philadelphia Government Structured?, MOVING PHILLY FORWARD, 
https://www.movingphillyforward.org/philadelphia-government-structure [https://perma.cc/JZ89-
S78E]. 
 66 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 35, at 3. 
 67 Id. 
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veto power.68 And further like Chicago, council members have praised 
prerogative for fostering local accountability.69 
Philadelphia’s prerogative tradition dates back to at least 1919.70 A 
recent examination of city votes demonstrates the tradition is stronger than 
ever: of the city council’s votes on 1,342 total ordinances between 2008 and 
2014, 730 ordinances were subject to prerogative.71 Strikingly, legislators 
cast only six total nay votes within this latter subset.72 Just four ordinances 
failed to receive unanimous support, and those four still passed.73 
Philadelphia has recently instituted land use reforms, including a new zoning 
code in 201174 and a new land bank in 2013.75 The city specifically designed 
the land bank “to transform a dysfunctional system of property disposition”76 
and further reformed it as recently as October 2019.77 But despite these 
attempts at reform, Philadelphia has not yet touched a major source of its 
problems—councilmanic prerogative still reigns.78 
Courts in Pennsylvania have started acknowledging the practice, albeit 
only recently.79 In January 2020, Philadelphia’s prerogative tradition flared 
up when federal prosecutors indicted a council member for wire fraud, 
 
 68 Id. 
 69 Council members argue “they can stop or alter projects that are not good fits for neighborhoods,” 
and the city council president argues “[n]obody knows a community better than the district council person 
that represents it.” Id. at 1. 
 70 Id. at 3. 
 71 Id. at 17–18. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 See Jake Blumgart, Zoning (Philadelphia), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GREATER PHILA. (2017), 
https://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/archive/zoning-philadelphia/ [https://perma.cc/V9JP-FQY5]. 
 75 See Melissa Romero, What You Need to Know About the Philadelphia Land Bank, CURBED PHILA. 
(Dec. 10, 2015, 12:30 PM), https://philly.curbed.com/2015/12/10/9892464/philadelphia-land-bank-
what-you-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/9P3X-3AUB]. 
 76 Tony Abraham, Philadelphia Just Became the Largest City in America with a Land Bank, 
GENEROCITY (Dec. 9, 2015, 3:30 PM), https://generocity.org/philly/2015/12/09/philadelphia-land-bank/ 
[https://perma.cc/H57U-UL82]. 
 77 Phila., Pa., Bill 190606-AA (Oct. 24, 2019); see also Press Release, Comm. of Seventy, City 
Council Passes Reform to Vacant Land Sale Process (Oct. 31, 2019), https://seventy.org/media/press-
releases/2019/10/31/city-council-passes-reform-to-vacant-land-sale-process [https://perma.cc/B83B-
WBWV]. 
 78 See Julia Terruso, The Primary Election Issue Most Philly Voters Have Never Heard Of: 
Councilmanic Prerogative, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/ 
philadelphia/councilmanic-prerogative-city-council-darrell-clarke-development-kenyatta-johnson-
gentrification-building-primary-20190227.html [https://perma.cc/6RC3-MB4Z]; Ernest Owens, 
Opinion, Want to Reduce Political Corruption in Philly? End Councilmanic Prerogative Now., PHILA. 
MAG. (Feb. 5, 2020, 12:27 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2020/02/05/kenyatta-johnson-
indictment-councilmanic-prerogative/ [https://perma.cc/N4NZ-73LA]. 
 79 See infra Section I.A. 
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accusing him of abusing his prerogative for bribes in connection with zoning 
demands from a charter school.80 Local media outlets, including the 
Philadelphia Inquirer, have called for prerogative’s demise and an end to 
corruption.81 But if history is any indication, the public outcry will dissipate, 
and prerogative will continue to loom over Philadelphia governance.82 
C. National Prevalence 
Although prerogative is most famous in Chicago and Philadelphia, 
many other cities across the country employ similar regimes. Prerogative is 
far more pervasive than commentators currently recognize, largely because 
other cities’ traditions are less visible than prerogative in Chicago and 
Philadelphia. Nonetheless, the following cities illustrate prerogative’s 
nationwide reach and demonstrate that it likely exists on an even broader 
scale than previously realized. 
 
 80 Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., E. Dist. of Pa., Philadelphia City Councilman Kenyatta Johnson 
and His Wife Indicted in Wide-Ranging Fraud and Bribery Case Also Involving Former Universal 
Company Executives (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/philadelphia-city-
councilman-kenyatta-johnson-and-his-wife-indicted-wide-ranging-fraud [https://perma.cc/5J5G-95R5]; 
Jake Blumgart, Why Philly Can’t Quit the Tradition at the Center of FBI’s Kenyatta Johnson Case, 
WHYY (Jan. 30, 2020), https://whyy.org/articles/why-philly-council-still-backs-the-tradition-at-the-
center-of-kenyatta-johnsons-fbi-case/ [https://perma.cc/473C-6A57]; Ryan Briggs, Philly 
Councilmember Kenyatta Johnson Corruption Trial Scheduled for 2021, WHYY (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://whyy.org/articles/philly-councilmember-kenyatta-johnson-corruption-trial-scheduled-for-2021/ 
[https://perma.cc/7E97-74JW] (Johnson’s trial is scheduled for January 2021). Further demonstrating the 
connection between Philadelphia political corruption and prerogative, “all six City Councilmembers who 
have been criminally convicted since 1981 were charged over matters that concerned councilmanic 
prerogative.” Owens, supra note 78. 
 81 See, e.g., Kyle Sammin, Councilmanic Prerogative Is Philadelphia’s Invitation to Corruption, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 17, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/commentary/ 
councilmanic-prerogative-kenyatta-johnson-philadelphia-20200217.html [https://perma.cc/Q9HM-
UWKY]; Jon Geeting, R.I.P Councilmanic Prerogative, PHILA. CITIZEN (Feb. 2, 2020), 
https://thephiladelphiacitizen.org/councilmanic-prerogative-planning/ [https://perma.cc/4UUG-83WD]; 
Owens, supra note 78. 
 82 See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 35, at 23. 
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New York City engages in a prerogative practice known as “member 
deference.”83 Dating back to at least the 1890s,84 member deference consists 
of unwritten agreements where local legislators control land use decisions in 
their districts.85 The city’s Uniform Land Use Review Procedure partially 
enables member deference by requiring hyperlocal review of land use 
decisions. The city’s planning department is required to forward any 
development materials to the affected borough president, community board, 
and borough board.86 By giving these stakeholders formal but merely 
advisory review, their perspectives can inform the individual council 
member who actually wields member deference.87 
For example, in fall 2019, New York City considered replacing the 
infamous Rikers Island jail with four borough-based alternatives.88 The jail 
planned for Brooklyn faced opposition from both the borough president and 
the local community board.89 Despite their opposition, the local council 
member supported the Brooklyn jail and specifically noted the power he 
wielded through member deference during a closed-door meeting with his 
 
 83 See Alec Schierenbeck, End the Council’s Land-Use Veto: The Path to a More Affordable, Fairer 
New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-end-the-
councils-land-use-veto-20191022-3mfmgfdbmfaflgmgtnovvbitdq-story.html [https://perma.cc/XQ2L-
EZQT] (describing member deference and calling to end its use in New York City); Roderick M. Hills, 
Jr. & David Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air: Transferable Development Rights and 
‘Constituency Effects’ in Land Use Law, J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 56–58), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3504372 [https://perma.cc/E7SH-RK4V] [hereinafter Hills & Schleicher, 
Building Coalitions out of Thin Air] (describing prerogative in New York City).  
 84 Like Chicago, the historical predecessor of New York City’s member deference was also called 
aldermanic courtesy. See, e.g., Busy Session of Aldermen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1899, at 14; “Aldermanic 
Courtesy” Reconsidered, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1893, at 9; They Felt Like Rebuking, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
1893, at 9. 
 85 Samar Khurshid, On Land Use, Johnson Promises ‘Deference’ to Members but ‘No Veto,’ 
GOTHAM GAZETTE (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.gothamgazette.com/city/7530-on-land-use-johnson-
promises-deference-to-members-but-no-veto [https://perma.cc/8KBV-FWQF]; see also John Mangin, 
Ethnic Enclaves and the Zoning Game, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 419, 430 n.42 (2018) (“Though not 
formalized, the City Council typically defers to the member of the affected district when determining how 
to vote on an action.”). 
 86 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 197-c(b) (2004), http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/section 
%201133_citycharter.pdf [https://perma.cc/YM44-KMAM]. 
 87 Mangin, supra note 85, at 430 n.42 (describing the advisory versus deferential mechanics of the 
New York City Uniform Land Use Review Procedure). 
 88 See Caroline Spivack, Rikers Island Closure and Borough-Based Jail Plan, Explained, CURBED 
N.Y. (Feb. 26, 2020, 12:47 PM), https://ny.curbed.com/2019/7/9/18307769/nyc-rikers-island-closure-
borough-based-jails-plan-explained [https://perma.cc/K2AW-X6GE]. 
 89 Noah Goldberg, What Happened with the Jail Plan This Year?, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE (Dec. 30, 
2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/12/30/what-happened-with-the-jail-plan-this-year/ 
[https://perma.cc/7XW9-AEAE]. 
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colleagues from the Brooklyn delegation.90 One month after his remarks, 
prerogative seemingly worked its magic when the city council approved the 
plan.91 
Further down the coast in Maryland, the Baltimore City92 and County93 
Councils each employ their own prerogative regimes, both called 
“councilmanic courtesy.”94 At the county level, prerogative remains such a 
fixture that council members publicly extol its virtues95 despite public 
backlash.96 At the city level, councilmanic courtesy proved influential when 
a local development company proposed redeveloping Baltimore’s Port 
Covington and asked for the third largest tax-increment financing deal in the 
 
 90 The local Brooklyn Eagle obtained a recording of the meeting, where Council Member Levin said: 
“[I]f there’s any issues that you have that are coming to mind through this process, please let me 
know . . . . [A]s you know, the way that with land-use there’s some member deference.” Brooklyn Eagle 
Staff, Transcript: Councilmember Stephen Levin on ‘Member Deference,’ BROOK. DAILY EAGLE (Sept. 
10, 2019), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2019/09/10/transcript-councilmember-stephen-levin-on-
member-deference/ [https://perma.cc/58XC-7EXU]. 
 91 Press Release, N.Y.C. Council, Council Votes on Historic Legislation to Close Rikers Island (Oct. 
17, 2019), https://council.nyc.gov/press/2019/10/17/1818/ [https://perma.cc/DZ97-U9GX]. See 
generally Matthews Haag, N.Y.C. Votes to Close Rikers. Now Comes the Hard Part., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/nyregion/rikers-island-closing-vote.html [https:// 
perma.cc/B4N7-8YQC] (describing the politics and consequence of closing Rikers). 
 92 See Jeff Fraley, Opinion, Transform Baltimore Must Not Eliminate Space for Industry, BALT. BUS. 
J. (Sept. 23, 2016, 11:21 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/blog/real-
estate/2016/09/opiniontransform-baltimore-must-not-eliminate.html [https://perma.cc/5BCK-GL97]. 
 93 See David Plymyer, Time to Get Rid of a Relic of Baltimore County’s Checkered Past, FORWARD 
BALT. (Dec. 10, 2019), https://forwardbaltimore.com/2019/12/10/time-to-get-rid-of-a-relic-of-baltimore-
countys-checkered-past/ [https://perma.cc/S3U3-LHLA]; Pamela Wood, Baltimore County Council to 
Vote on Rezoning Decisions, BALT. SUN (Aug. 28, 2016), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-county/bs-md-co-zoning-vote-20160828-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/J7XQ-CCBL]. 
 94 Councilmanic courtesy is also allegedly employed in other Maryland counties. See Terry v. Cnty. 
Council, No. 2756, 2019 WL 3453242, at *7 n.12 (Md. Spec. App. July 31, 2019) (finding an allegation 
of councilmanic courtesy in Bowie, the largest city in Prince George’s County, unfounded); Howard’s 
Councilmanic Discourtesy, BALT. SUN (May 18, 1992), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-
1992-05-18-1992139203-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q9AC-QWXW] (describing councilmanic 
courtesy in Howard County); Ruth Marcus, P.G. Proceeds with Caution on Development, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 29, 1984, at A1 (describing councilmanic courtesy in Prince George’s County). 
 95 For example, Baltimore County Council Member David Marks pointed to the accountability 
justification: “If we did not have Councilmanic courtesy, you could have a situation where four Council 
members might override the district representative, and the voters would have no way to hold those four 
other Council members accountable.” See Klaus Philipsen, Interview with Councilman Who Wants to 
Pull Plug on Mighty Developer, CMTY. ARCHITECT DAILY (June 29, 2017), https:// 
communityarchitectdaily.blogspot.com/2017/06/interview-with-councilman-who-wants-to.html 
[https://perma.cc/V8Q7-42QE]. 
 96 See Plymyer, supra note 93 (concluding a discussion of councilmanic courtesy’s impact by noting 
the “sooner this Baltimore County tradition dies, the better”). 
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country’s history—a request subject to major local controversy.97 One former 
council member explicitly justified his support out of respect for 
councilmanic courtesy, explaining that he voted for the deal because the 
South Baltimore council member who represented Port Covington also 
favored it.98 
A 2017 lawsuit filed by North Baltimore neighborhood groups further 
demonstrates prerogative’s local impact. The neighborhood groups attacked 
councilmanic courtesy, arguing the city had impermissibly approved an 
upscale apartment project. The neighborhood groups cited to a Baltimore 
land use committee hearing transcript in which a council member would not 
even consider the merits of the project because it was located outside her 
district.99 The council member deferred: “This particular project is in the 
Fifth District. It’s the decision of the Fifth District Councilperson. And on 
that note, I’ll stop here, and my vote is a yes.”100 In dicta, the judge 
characterized prerogative as “inconsistent” with a legislator’s obligation to 
impartially decide.101 Nonetheless, the record showed the difficulty of 
distinguishing between absolute deference and a decision on the merits, and 
the court declined to decide on prerogative’s effect, vacating the project’s 
approval on other grounds.102 
Moving inland, Nashville’s practice of prerogative is also called 
councilmanic courtesy and exists as an unwritten tradition dating back at 
least to the 1970s.103 As a consolidated government with surrounding 
 
 97 See, e.g., Ron Cassie, Tomorrowland: Port Covington Will Be Like Nothing Baltimore Has Ever 
Seen. But at What Cost?, BALT. MAG. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.baltimoremagazine.com/ 
2017/12/4/tomorrowland-the-future-of-port-covington-in-baltimore [https://perma.cc/QU3C-FHP5]. 
 98 Id. 
 99 In re Hudson, No. 24-C-17-004307, slip op. at 1, 44 (Balt. City Cir. Ct. Dec. 20 2019), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/sfdev-bucket/rolandpark/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Memo-Opinion-
Overlook-at-Roland-Park-12.20.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF2V-P9LX]. See generally Ed Gunts, Judge 
Rules the Controversial Overlook at Roland Park Apartment Project Can’t Be Built, BALT. FISHBOWL 
(Dec. 23, 2019), https://baltimorefishbowl.com/stories/judge-rules-the-controversial-overlook-at-roland-
park-apartment-project-cant-be-built/ [https://perma.cc/W25N-N5DF] (describing the backdrop and 
community implications of the lawsuit). 
 100 Hudson, No. 24-C-17-004307, slip op. at 44.  
 101 Id. at 100; see also Nestor M. Davidson, Localist Administrative Law, 126 YALE L.J. 564, 603 
(2017) (describing how “some courts review individualized determinations by local legislative bodies as 
though the relevant action was actually ‘quasi-judicial’”). 
 102 Hudson, No. 24-C-17-004307, slip op. at 100 (“Because the Court is reversing the decision on 
other grounds, the Court declines to decide in isolation whether this record requires reversal on the ground 
that the Committee’s decision was improperly affected by councilmanic courtesy.”). 
 103 See Clariday v. State, 552 S.W.2d 759, 762–63 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (“[T]his case 
undoubtedly was precipitated by the existence of a local practice known as ‘councilmanic courtesy.’ 
Under this practice, proposed zoning and sewer ordinance changes were subject to veto by the council 
member in whose district the proposed changes would be effected.”); C.J. HEIN, JOYCE M. KEYS & G.M. 
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Davidson County, courtesy in Nashville is particularly critical to zoning 
votes because of the council’s size at forty members—the third largest in the 
country.104 Although the region has a Metropolitan Planning Commission 
tasked with maintaining a development plan and providing zoning 
recommendations in adherence to that plan,105 prerogative’s inherent 
parochialism regularly overrides the Commission’s regional approach to 
planning.106 One council member opined in a 2018 interview that he could 
not think of a single zoning bill where he did not receive deference.107 
Tennessee journalists have called councilmanic courtesy “as strong today as 
ever,”108 leading to “pre-ordained” outcomes in zoning decisions.109 
On the West Coast, San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors wields 
“supervisorial prerogative.”110 San Francisco’s prerogative impacts land use 
decisions ranging from housing construction111 to bikeshare expansion.112 
Although supervisorial prerogative has only emerged in recent years,113 it has 
quickly become a focal point in the city’s housing plight. For example, a 
local coalition supporting affordable housing called YIMBY, or “Yes In My 
 
ROBBINS, REGIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS: NINE CASE STUDIES 
178 (1974) (“Within the council a ritual known as councilmanic courtesy provides a piecemeal decision-
making tool in zoning decisions. . . . Among the thirty-five district council members, zoning matters are 
automatically decided on the basis of the position of that district’s council representative.”). See generally 
Ola Johansson, Changing Governance, Business Elites, and Local Regulation in Nashville 92, 104, 121–
22 (Aug. 2004) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville) (on file with journal) (describing 
the historical relevance of councilmanic courtesy on Nashville’s development). 
 104 See Michael Karlick, Interview #78: Nashville, TN Councilman Colby Sledge, CITY COUNCIL 
CHRONS. (Jan. 14, 2018), https://councilchronicles.com/2018/01/14/interview-78-nashville-tn-
councilman-colby-sledge-with-podcast/ [https://perma.cc/NY76-S7HB] (“[W]hen you have a legislative 
body that’s this large dealing with land-use issues, it tends to be the unwritten rule.”). 
 105 NASHVILLE, TENN., CODE § 11.504(h) (Oct. 4, 1988). 
 106 See Rau & Garrison, supra note 41 (“Davis has managed to pass the zoning bills in the face of 
opposition from the commission by evoking a longstanding tradition of councilmanic courtesy.”). 
 107 Karlick, supra note 104. 
 108 Rau & Garrison, supra note 41. 
 109 Peter White, Gentrification in North Nashville, TENN. TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2019), 
https://tntribune.com/investigative-stories/gentrification-in-north-nashville [https://perma.cc/AQS3-
JL35]. 
 110 See Randy Shaw, The Failure of District Elections, BEYOND CHRON (Jan. 7, 2020), 
http://beyondchron.org/the-failure-of-district-elections/ [https://perma.cc/HK9E-4KC4].  
 111 Mike Ege, How San Francisco’s District Boundaries Keep Housing Scarce, BAY CITY BEACON 
(July 22, 2018), https://www.thebaycitybeacon.com/politics/how-san-francisco-s-district-boundaries-
keep-housing-scarce/article_cf0a8306-8dfc-11e8-b2a9-5f7463e49399.html [https://perma.cc/87TQ-
Z2MA].  
 112 Jane Natoli, Show, Don’t Tell, MEDIUM (Aug. 13, 2018), https://medium.com/@wafoli/show-
dont-tell-9d1872240c31 [https://perma.cc/9SJW-5KYX]. 
 113 Ege, supra note 111 (describing supervisorial prerogative as an “emerging practice” and sourcing 
its “behind-the-scenes” practice). 
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Backyard” Action asked supervisor candidates if they would adhere to 
supervisorial prerogative and received responses ranging from full to 
conditional support.114 Prerogative also recently sparked controversy in the 
city’s Mission neighborhood when a developer wanted to build a seventy-
five-unit tower in place of an existing laundromat he owned.115 The city first 
forced him to spend $23,000 conducting a historical study of the laundromat, 
though there was little reason to believe it merited landmark status.116 Then, 
the Board of Supervisors voted to indefinitely delay the project to analyze its 
shadow impact on an adjacent school playground.117 The developer sued, 
arguing the Board of Supervisors had effectively delegated approval 
authority to the local supervisor as a matter of prerogative, a claim further 
substantiated by the San Francisco Planning Department’s prior approval of 
the project.118 The suit heightened public attention to the “sheer 
ridiculousness”119 of the process, which in turn prompted city officials to 
quietly push the project through and moot the suit.120 
Los Angeles city council members do not wield prerogative on land use 
decisions like zoning, but they previously exercised a rare codified form of 
prerogative through a “letter of acknowledgment” requirement.121 Whereas 
 
 114 Compare Gordon Mar: Candidate – San Francisco District 4 Supervisor, YIMBY ACTION, 
https://yimbyaction.org/questionnaire/gordon-mar/ [https://perma.cc/Z2EA-HN2V] (“[S]upervisorial 
prerogative . . . speaks to the core value of district elections: that communities and neighborhoods should 
have a voice in the decisions that directly impact them.”), with Rafael Mandelman: Candidate – San 
Francisco District 8 Supervisor, YIMBY ACTION, https://yimbyaction.org/questionnaire/rafael-
mandelman/ [https://perma.cc/A4S5-38Z3] (“[S]ome matters . . . [should] outweigh so-called 
‘supervisorial prerogative.’ The siting of an affordable housing development is one obvious example.”). 
 115 Julian Mark, Is the Wash Club Building a Historic Resource to SF’s Mission?, MISSION LOCAL 
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://missionlocal.org/2018/02/is-the-wash-club-building-a-historic-resource-to-sfs-
mission/ [https://perma.cc/7ZD4-DUTW]. 
 116 Joe Eskenazi, The Strange and Terrible Saga of San Francisco’s ‘Historic Laundromat’ 
Represents the Worst of Planning and Development in This Town, MISSION LOCAL (June 26, 2018), 
https://missionlocal.org/2018/06/the-strange-and-terrible-saga-of-san-franciscos-historic-laundromat-
represents-the-worst-of-planning-and-development-in-this-town/ [https://perma.cc/3BTY-9L9F].  
 117 One anonymous city official commented that the city’s demand for a shadow study was 
“ludicrous.” Id.  
 118 Complaint at 2–3, RRTI, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. CPF-18-516301 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 
20, 2018), https://www.docdroid.net/wJNkdqI/sf-1088649-v1-rrti-verified-petition-for-writ-of-mandate-
complaint-for-damages-injunctive-and-declaratory-relief.pdf#page=3 [https://perma.cc/NXF5-A4P9].  
 119 Eskenazi, supra note 116. 
 120 See Julian Mark, How the Developer of SF’s ‘Historic’ Laundromat Quietly Won, MISSION 
LOCAL (Feb. 4, 2019), https://missionlocal.org/2019/02/how-the-developer-of-sfs-historic-laundromat-
quietly-won/ [https://perma.cc/Z9Z3-FEFU].  
 121 These city-level public financing options include its Affordable Housing Managed Pipeline 
Program and Proposition HHH Loan program. See Council District Office Letter of Acknowledgement, 
L.A. HOUS. & CMTY. INV. DEP’T (2017), https://hcidla.lacity.org/council-office-letter-acknowledgement 
[https://perma.cc/5YRP-WSG6].  
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many prerogative regimes consist of the legislative body deferring to a single 
legislator, Los Angeles’ regime consisted of an administrative body 
deferring.122 In this case, the municipal agency that administered public 
financing for housing developments deferred to the legislator, and if a 
council member withheld the letter of acknowledgment—a requirement to 
access the city’s public financing for affordable housing developments—the 
project would not be financed.123 Rather than relying on an unwritten 
tradition, the city council codified the letter of acknowledgment requirement 
in an ordinance.124 But, after much public consternation, state-level 
legislative pushback, and potential legal liability, the city council voted to 
curtail this prerogative practice by striking the letter requirement in 2018.125 
As further detailed in Part IV, Los Angeles represents one of the only 
instances where legislators have curbed their own prerogative power.126 
While these cities illustrate prominent examples of prerogative, this 
Section’s overview only scratches the surface. In cities like St. Louis,127 
Milwaukee,128 Cleveland,129 and Springfield, Illinois,130 prerogative is hardly 
 
 122 Emily Alpert Reyes, L.A. Lawmakers Can Block Homeless Housing Projects by Simply 
Withholding a Key Letter, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/ 
local/lanow/la-me-ln-council-power-20180312-story.html [https://perma.cc/F852-GSW6].  
 123 Id. City administrators have argued the letters “ensure that Council [member] Offices are aware 
of the agencies applying in their District,” paralleling similar accountability justifications across the 
country. Memorandum from Richard H. Llewellyn, Jr., Interim City Admin. Off., to Mayor & City 
Council 8 (May 16, 2017), https://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2017/17-0090_rpt_CAO_05-16-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9LKR-6E5Y].  
 124 See SHAW, supra note 26, at 61. 
 125 Emily Alpert Reyes, L.A. Will Eliminate ‘Veto’ Provision for Homeless and Affordable Housing 
to Keep State Funding, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-ln-homeless-letter-20181017-story.html [https://perma.cc/4CDC-UVBN].  
 126 See infra Section I.B. 
 127 See Sarah Harney, Are City Councils a Relic of the Past?, GOVERNING (Apr. 2003), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/Are-City-Councils-Relic-Past.html [https://perma.cc/PAZ7-
9AVB] (describing how St. Louis’s tradition of aldermanic privilege has enabled parochialism). 
 128 See State v. Tronca, 267 N.W.2d 216, 218 (Wis. 1978) (challenging the denial of a liquor license 
due to prerogative); JASON ADKINS, UNHAPPY DAYS FOR MILWAUKEE ENTREPRENEURS: BREW CITY 
REGULATIONS MAKE IT HARD FOR BUSINESSES TO ACHIEVE THE HIGH LIFE 14–17 (2010) (describing 
how aldermanic privilege “allows aldermen to act like petty despots in their districts”); Dave Begel, 
Common Council Should Get Out of Liquor License Business, ONMILWAUKEE (Jan. 14, 2013, 3:09 PM), 
https://onmilwaukee.com/bars/articles/liquorlicences.html [https://perma.cc/8MPS-HAEP] (describing 
aldermanic privilege in conjunction with granting liquor licenses). 
 129 WILLIAM E. NELSON, JR. & PHILIP J. MERANTO, ELECTING BLACK MAYORS 356 (1977) 
(describing how Cleveland’s chairmen of council committees invoked councilmanic courtesy to block 
legislation). 
 130 Editorial, Our Opinion: City Council’s Inconsistency Is Troubling, ST. J.-REG. (Oct. 29, 2009, 
7:51 PM), https://www.sj-r.com/x1717113033/Our-Opinion-City-council-s-inconsistency-is-troubling 
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noted, but occasional media coverage suggests it exists. Due to prerogative’s 
typically unwritten nature, commentators have little to reference beyond 
media stories or legislators’ public comments. Furthermore, because 
prerogative is conceptually only a matter of deference, it is not necessarily 
apparent to outsiders—distinguishing between a legislator exercising 
prerogative and a unanimous nonprerogative vote on the merits can be a tall 
order.131 Nonetheless, the foregoing survey demonstrates prerogative’s 
national grasp on local political decision-making. 
II. LEGISLATOR VETOES 
While the prerogative regimes just reviewed have long been associated 
with heightened risk of corruption, prerogative also enables legislators to 
perpetuate existing patterns of racial segregation by blocking the 
development of affordable housing—a phenomenon that should be 
associated with the term “local veto.” Extensive scholarship has discussed 
local governments’ efforts to block affordable housing development, often 
describing municipalities as exercising local vetoes.132 For example, 
Professor Stacy Seicshnaydre described a 2007 housing bill proposal in 
Louisiana that required approval from a parish governing authority to 
allocate tax credits as creating a local veto.133 In 2016, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) used the term in a formal ruling when it announced that it 
“neither requires nor encourages” state housing agencies to “honor local 
vetoes” when allocating low-income housing tax credits.134 In short, this term 
 
[https://perma.cc/8HT9-4HDB] (reporting a “classic case of aldermanic privilege” when the city council 
made a liquor-licensing exception). 
 131 On the issue of legislative intent writ large, Justice Antonin Scalia aptly noted that “discerning 
the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task. 
The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite.” Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 132 See, e.g., Philip D. Tegeler, Housing Segregation and Local Discretion, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 209, 217 
(1994) (describing a requirement for a locality to document its need for low-income housing as “a 
standardless local veto over federally funded public housing”); Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Exclusionary 
Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 629 (1973) (describing local 
governments’ failure to act when implementing federal subsidy programs as a “local veto”); Herbert M. 
Franklin, Federal Power and Subsidized Housing, 3 URB. LAW. 61, 63–64 (1971) (describing how every 
metropolitan area, save Honolulu, has a low-income housing operation with a “local veto”). 
 133 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial Segregation: Lessons from 
Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 688 (2011). 
 134 The implication is that state administrators would no longer necessarily defer to municipalities if 
the municipality exercised a local veto over affordable housing projects seeking LIHTC financing. Rev. 
Rul. 2016-29, 2016-52 I.R.B. 6; see Alan D. Viard, Low Income Housing Tax Credits and the 
Concentration of Poverty, AEIDEAS (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.aei.org/economics/low-income-
housing-tax-credits-and-the-concentration-of-poverty [https://perma.cc/W8DR-34NT] (“The [IRS] 
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has largely been used in an intermunicipal context—cities exercising local 
vetoes to block affordable housing within their boundaries.135 The term’s 
relevance, however, is just as applicable in an intramunicipal context—local 
legislators exercising sublocal vetoes through prerogative to block 
affordable development within their districts.136 
This Part discusses this relationship between prerogative and local 
vetoes, describing the interaction at the microlocal level as a “legislator 
veto.” The first Section describes the mechanics of how financing and land 
use approval enable legislator vetoes. The second Section then traces a brief 
history of antidevelopment sentiment and its connection to segregation, 
which explains why a local legislator might exercise the veto in the first 
place. 
A. Affordable Housing and Hyperlocal Control 
Federal housing policy today can be divided between promoting 
homeownership and assisting low-income renters.137 Whereas the former 
dominates in terms of federal expenditures,138 the latter serves a higher need 
population—homeowners’ median income is roughly double the income of 
renters.139 This Note focuses on the rental-assistance component of federal 
housing policy.140 A massive shortage of affordable units exists today: only 
 
ruling points out that a local opportunity to comment is not the same as a local veto.”). Because the IRS 
ruling is not a mandate, some state agencies still defer to local vetoes in Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) allocation. See, e.g., Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 946 F.3d 649, 656–57 
(5th Cir. 2019) (finding “it’s entirely speculative” that eliminating the local veto criteria would result in 
LIHTC allocation to integrative projects). 
 135 See, e.g., Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Separated by Design: Why Affordable Housing Is Built in 
Areas with High Crime, Few Jobs and Struggling Schools, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 25, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/separated-by-design-why-affordable-housing-is-built-in-areas-with-
high-crime-few-jobs-and-struggling-schools [https://perma.cc/5CXV-Z55V] (reporting how Connecticut 
state agencies disproportionately award LIHTC funding to high-poverty areas); infra notes 287–291 and 
accompanying text (describing the disparate allocation of low-income housing tax credits in the Baltimore 
region). 
 136 See, e.g., Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 15–17 (describing a Chicago alderman effectively killing 
a fifty-five-unit affordable housing development in Portage Park by withdrawing his support). 
 137 See John D. Landis & Kirk McClure, Rethinking Federal Housing Policy, 76 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 
319, 320 (2010). 
 138 Id. (estimating the federal government spent $6 assisting homeowners for every $1 assisting low-
income renters in 2008). 
 139 JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING 2017, at 10 (2017), 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/harvard_jchs_americas_rental_housing_2017_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5KM5-WX5H] (contrasting the 2016 cash-renter median income of $37,300 to the 
homeowner median income of $73,100). 
 140 This Note does not intend to pick a side in affordable housing’s longstanding preservation-versus-
mobility debate. Rather, this Note attempts to draw attention to prerogative and legislator vetoes insofar 
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thirty-six affordable rental units are available for every one hundred 
extremely low-income renter households.141 Furthermore, access to 
affordable rental housing disproportionately impacts communities of color, 
especially Black Americans, who account for 12% of all households, yet also 
account for 26% of all low-income renters.142 To be sure, race and class are 
not proxies.143 But “address[ing] the full range of discriminatory and 
segregationist factors influencing people of color in American housing 
markets” necessarily requires discussing income-based restrictions on 
housing because of the overlap between race and poverty.144 Accordingly, 
the location of affordable-housing development can shape the racial makeup 
of the neighborhoods and cities in which this housing is sited.145 
 
as they constrain the supply of affordable housing options that might otherwise be available for mobility 
advocates. See generally SHEILA CROWLEY & DANILO PELLETIERE, AFFORDABLE HOUSING DILEMMA: 
THE PRESERVATION VS. MOBILITY DEBATE (2012), 
https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/affordablehousingdilemmareportmay-2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V7YM-253A] (finding that “over time the pendulum in the debate . . . has swung back 
and forth between poverty dispersal and place-based strategies that seek to help poor people in their 
current neighborhoods”). 
 141 Where “extremely low-income” is defined as at or below the poverty guideline or 30% of the area 
median income (whichever is higher). AURAND ET AL., supra note 24, at 1. 
 142 “[N]on-Hispanic white households account for 65% of all U.S. households (including 
homeowners and renters), 50% of all renters, and 43% of all extremely low-income renters. Black 
households account for 12% of all households, yet they account for 19% of all renters and 26% of all 
extremely low-income renters. Hispanic households account for 12% of all U.S. households, 19% of all 
renters, and 21% of extremely low-income renters.” Id. at 13; see also Matthew Desmond, Unaffordable 
America: Poverty, Housing, and Eviction, 22 FAST FOCUS 1, 1 (2015) (arguing rental affordability 
disproportionately impacts Black-American and Hispanic households); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF 
HARV. UNIV., supra note 139, at 17 (finding the median household income of Hispanic renters 
approximately 15% lower and Black renters 30% lower than white renters, holding age constant). 
 143 See generally Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones & Sonya R. Porter, Race and 
Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 135 Q.J. ECON. 711 (2020) 
(using intergenerational economic data to explain racial disparities in income). One group of scholars 
responded to the Chetty et al. research with the following: “One of the most popular liberal post-racial 
ideas is the idea that the fundamental problem is class and not race, and clearly this study explodes that 
idea . . . .” Emily Badger, Claire Cain Miller, Adam Pearce & Kevin Quealy, Extensive Data Shows 
Punishing Reach of Racism for Black Boys, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/19/upshot/race-class-white-and-black-men.html 
[https://perma.cc/A3RU-QFAF] (providing data visualizations for the Chetty et al. research). 
 144 EDWARD G. GOETZ, THE ONE-WAY STREET OF INTEGRATION: FAIR HOUSING AND THE PURSUIT 
OF RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN CITIES 19 (2018). See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 177–88 
(analyzing race, economic status, and housing); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013) (same). 
 145 See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial 
Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 878 (2006) (“[S]tructural racism that restricts affordable 
housing to ghettoized areas of the urban core intensifies racial segregation and perpetuates poverty.”); 
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, LEN ALBRIGHT, REBECCA CASCIANO, ELIZABETH DERICKSON & DAVID N. 
KINSEY, CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY 
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Originally, the federal government attempted to address the lack of 
affordable rental units with public housing projects,146 but such projects have 
declined over recent decades.147 Instead, federal housing policy now 
primarily consists of subsidizing private sector development,148 either 
through vouchers or tax credits.149 An affordable housing development has 
two key elements that require signoff from local government actors: 
financing and land use approval. Financing subsidies include low-income 
housing tax credits, tax-increment financing, and other special municipal 
funding opportunities.150 Land use approval includes zoning changes, 
permitting requirements, historical district compliance, environmental 
impact review, and more.151 
 
IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 6, 21 (2013) (arguing housing-mobility programs, including subsidized 
affordable housing and rental vouchers, “constitute an efficacious way” to decrease racial and class 
segregation); MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER & LYNETTE RAWLINGS, URB. INST., PROMOTING 
NEIGHBORHOOD DIVERSITY: BENEFITS, BARRIERS, AND STRATEGIES 11 (2009), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30631/411955-Promoting-Neighborhood-
Diversity-Benefits-Barriers-and-Strategies.PDF [https://perma.cc/5DUQ-3X3C] (arguing for expanding 
affordable housing options in affluent white jurisdictions to challenge “the persistence of racial and ethnic 
exclusion”). 
 146 Affordable housing is definitionally distinct from public housing, although they are often 
conflated. U.S. Department for Housing and Urban Development (HUD) defines the former as any 
housing that costs less than 30% of post-tax income, whereas the latter is a federal program that contracts 
with quasi-governmental public housing authorities at the local level. MAGGIE MCCARTY, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R41654, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC HOUSING 1, 19 (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41654.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS3W-TWUT]. 
 147 See Landis & McClure, supra note 137, at 321–23 (overviewing the history of federal housing 
policy); Matthew Yglesias, Everything You Need to Know About the Affordable Housing Debate, VOX 
(May 11, 2015, 11:43 AM), https://www.vox.com/2014/4/10/18076868/affordable-housing-explained 
[https://perma.cc/RZ5G-CGEY] (“Over the past two decades, housing policy trends have been toward 
reducing the amount of public housing.”). For a comprehensive history, see generally Charles J. Orlebeke, 
The Evolution of Low‐Income Housing Policy, 1949 to 1999, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 489 (2000). 
 148 Cf. KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE 
INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 255 (2019) (arguing the political untenability of 
public housing preceded the state growing “dependent on private sector forces to produce, manage, and 
own the nation’s housing stock”). 
 149 See Landis & McClure, supra note 137, at 331–34 (contrasting public housing, vouchers, and tax 
credits—the latter two subsidizing private housing). 
 150 See generally Joe Cortright, A Solution for Displacement: TIF for Affordable Housing, CITY 
COMMENT. (Nov. 6, 2019), http://cityobservatory.org/a-solution-for-displacement-tif-for-affordable-
housing/ [https://perma.cc/RRM8-755G] (overviewing financing options); Kathleen Kane-Willis, 
Closing the Gap: Financing Affordable Housing in the Chicago Area, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN THE 
CHICAGO REGION: PERSPECTIVES AND STRATEGIES 58, 69–73 (Phil Nyden, James Lewis, Kale Williams 
& Nathan Benefield eds., 2003) (describing the mechanics of “closing the financing gap” for affordable 
housing developers). 
 151 See generally PACE LAND USE L. CTR., BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO LAND USE LAW, 
https://law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/LULC/LandUsePrimer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GUQ-RGJW] 
(overviewing land use law). 
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Every city approaches these approvals differently, often depending on 
the size of the municipality; some place decision-making in the hands of 
unelected administrators, while others require full legislative council 
signoff.152 In either case, support from the local legislator remains integral, 
inevitably necessitating political support subject to local pressures.153 These 
conditions give rise to legislator vetoes. 
For example, if city administrators who handle financing defer to a local 
legislator’s disapproval, the project will fail no matter how beneficial it may 
be or how much the local community may desire it. Similarly, if land use 
approval hinges on a majority vote in the city council but the council always 
defers to the legislator’s prerogative, the project is doomed from the outset 
without her support. Prerogative exacerbates the necessity of local political 
support by effectively giving a veto to the legislator of the district in which 
the affordable housing will be built. 
B. Historical Antidevelopment Sentiment 
Prerogative equips a local legislator with a tool to veto development, 
but this does not explain when and why she uses it. Constituency pressures 
provide the explanation. Antidevelopment sentiment today, unfortunately, 
builds upon an American history of segregation that has fundamentally 
intertwined race and housing. Modern housing patterns embody this 
connection.154 Although some jurists blame the market for segregation 
today,155 scholars have exposed the government’s comprehensive role in both 
shaping and perpetuating these housing patterns in far greater detail than this 
Note can.156 Accordingly, the following two examples—racially restrictive 
covenants and public housing—merely illustrate the underlying systemic 
racism that motivates antidevelopment sentiment today. 
 
 152 See Zimmermann, supra note 33 (overviewing local government structures). 
 153 See Katherine Levine Einstein, Maxwell Palmer & David M. Glick, Who Participates in Local 
Government? Evidence from Meeting Minutes, 17 PERSPS. ON POL. 28, 37–39 (2019) (describing the 
oppositional pressure from older, home-owning citizens exerted on lawmakers). 
 154 See Lutton et al., supra note 24 (mapping the lack of private mortgage lending to Black and Latino 
neighborhoods in Chicago); Williams & Emamdjomeh, supra note 22; LOGAN & STULTS, supra note 22. 
 155 Compare Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 750 (2007) 
(finding racial disparities resulted from de facto segregation “including voluntary housing choices”), with 
id. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation 
“meaningless”). 
 156 As previously mentioned, for an excellent historical account, see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25. For 
a more quantitatively driven account, see JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN: LOCAL 
POLITICS AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN CITIES (2018). 
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Racially restrictive covenants historically epitomized local hostility to 
integration.157 Primarily used throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, these covenants precluded the future sale of properties to African-
American homebuyers and ran with the land.158 Courts across the country 
justified their constitutionality by deeming the covenants private 
agreements.159 In 1948, the Supreme Court forbade these covenants in 
Shelley v. Kramer.160 Nevertheless, their impact persisted. The Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) continued financing subdivision 
developments that openly excluded African-American homebuyers until 
1962.161 Following Shelley, the FHA also continued insuring properties with 
covenants that required neighbor or community approval before authorizing 
a sale, functionally skirting Shelley’s proscription.162 Although the courts 
eventually curtailed these evasive post-Shelley tactics,163 these deeds still 
implicitly signaled that those formerly restricted would be shunned as 
outsiders.164 
Public housing policies have similarly evinced and instituted strong 
anti-integrationist impulses. As originally conceived and funded by the 
federal government during the New Deal, public housing addressed middle-
class housing shortages based on income rather than race.165 Federal officials, 
however, condoned segregated public housing in the 1949 Housing Act, 
 
 157 For a comprehensive overview of racial covenants and their legacy today, see RICHARD R. W. 
BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD: RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, 
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2013). 
 158 See id. at 3–4. 
 159 See, e.g., id. at 81 (discussing the Maryland Supreme Court’s 1938 decision in Meade v. 
Dennistone, 196 A. 330 (Md. 1938), which upheld racially restrictive covenants as neighborhood 
agreements). 
 160 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Shelley decision was decided by only six Justices—three Justices recused 
themselves because their own properties contained such covenants. Id. at 23. 
 161 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 88. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 90–91. 
 164 See BROOKS & ROSE, supra note 157, at 4, 177–82. Scholars argue new signaling devices have 
taken their place, also enforced by the courts, which continue to indicate hostility to nonwhite 
homebuyers. See, e.g., Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of 
Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173 (2019) (arguing crime-free housing ordinances 
enable racial discrimination); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential 
Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006) (arguing that “embedding costly, demographically polarizing 
amenities,” such as golf memberships, into covenants signals homebuyers’ racial preferences and 
excludes undesired races). 
 165 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 17. For a brief overview of the history of public housing, see 
MCCARTY, supra note 146, at 1–9. 
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thereby setting in motion a vicious cycle of racial isolation.166 Using federal 
funding from the Housing Act, city housing authorities selected public 
housing sites that maintained segregation.167 As the housing shortage 
following World War II eased, the real estate lobby successfully advocated 
for a strict income limit for public housing eligibility, forcing out middle-
class families.168 Conditions deteriorated as the lack of “middle-class rents 
resulted in inadequate maintenance budgets,” transforming “public housing 
into a warehousing system for the poor.”169 By the 1970s, the Nixon 
Administration decried these conditions and announced that public housing 
should not be forced on white communities.170 
The results of these and other policies are stark. Whereas in 1890, the 
average city-dwelling African American lived in a neighborhood that was 
27% Black, by 1990, that number had shot up to 56%.171 Racially segregated 
housing patterns that historically existed on a block-by-block basis now 
manifest across neighborhoods and even entire cities.172 Segregation has 
become an ingrained characteristic of the American city.173 
The traditional hostility to integration that previously generated racially 
restrictive covenants and federal public housing policies now animates 
 
 166 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 30–34. Even after Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, 
“President Eisenhower’s housing administrator told a congressional committee that the government 
should not ‘move too precipitously’ to eliminate racial segregation from federal programs.” Id. at 33. 
 167 Id. at 34–35. For one of the most famous examples of segregated public housing, see Gautreaux 
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969). 
 168 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 36. 
 169 Id. at 37; see also TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 254–55 (arguing the combination of physical 
decline and decreasing income limits transformed public housing into “housing of last resort”). 
 170 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 37. In a report to Congress, President Richard Nixon described 
public housing projects as “monstrous, depressing places—run down, overcrowded, crime-ridden, falling 
apart.” President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress Proposing Legislation and Outlining 
Administration Actions to Deal with Federal Housing Policy (Sept. 19, 1973), 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-proposing-legislation-and-
outlining-administration-actions [https://perma.cc/8ZAC-FQJV]. 
 171 David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of the American 
Ghetto, 107 J. POL. ECON. 455, 456 (1999); see also id. at 497–99 (using wards as proxies for 
neighborhoods from 1890 to 1940 and census tracts as proxies for neighborhoods post-1940). 
 172 TROUNSTINE, supra note 156, at 3. 
 173 Segregation’s impact today reaches beyond just housing, shaping, for example, the racial 
disparities in police fatally shooting unarmed victims. See Mesic et al., supra note 22, at 113 (finding 
“racial residential segregation was the most robust indicator associated with state-level racial disparities 
in police shootings of unarmed victims” where a ten-point increase in the state racial segregation index 
correlated with a 67% increase in the state’s ratio of police shootings of unarmed Black victims to police 
shootings of unarmed white victims). 
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neighborhood opposition to affordable housing.174 While these opponents 
tend to use coded language like “neighborhood character” and “property 
value preservation,” such concerns often mask an underlying discriminatory 
purpose, whether conscious or not.175 Even the current President has 
employed this racially implicit rhetoric, attacking affordable housing 
because it “bring[s] who knows into your suburbs, so your communities will 
be unsafe and your housing values will go down.”176 Further compounding 
this hostility, the loudest participants at local government meetings tend to 
be those who overwhelmingly oppose new development, thereby placing 
further pressure on local legislators to oppose such projects.177 Although 
 
 174 See, e.g., Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 13–15 (describing opposition to a development that 
would trigger affordable housing requirements in Chicago’s Edison Park neighborhood); see also 
TAYLOR, supra note 148, at 259–60 (“The conflation of race and risk to property value has been fully 
absorbed into the popular culture and real estate acumen of the United States.”); Patrick Sharkey, To 
Avoid Integration, Americans Built Barricades in Urban Space, ATLANTIC (June 20, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/barricades-let-urban-inequality-fester/613312/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z2VK-9H23] (connecting the history of racially restrictive covenants to urban housing 
policy today). 
 175 See BRIAN J. MCCABE, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: WEALTH, COMMUNITY & THE POLITICS OF 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 100 (2016); Paavo Monkkonen & Will Livesley-O’Neill, Overcoming Opposition to 
New Housing, UCLA LEWIS CTR. FOR REG’L POL’Y STUD. (2017), 
https://www.lewis.ucla.edu/opposition-to-new-housing/ [https://perma.cc/33MF-2659] (identifying 
motivations and methods for opposition to new housing); Chrishelle Palay, Opinion, It’s Time to Retire 
This Scapegoat for Segregation, NEXT CITY (May 31, 2017), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/houston-
affodable-housing-scapegoat-segregation-nimby [https://perma.cc/6B5J-3KFV] (describing the coded 
language in discriminatory, NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) responses to affordable housing). For 
examples of responses to such coded language, see Josh Lapp, Opinion, Preservation Efforts Should Be 
Used for Progress, Not NIMBYism, COLUMBUS UNDERGROUND (Oct. 8, 2019, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.columbusunderground.com/opinion-preservation-for-progress-not-nimbyism-jl1 
[https://perma.cc/T6UX-DCH7]; Marian Mumford, Letter to the Editor, Objections Have Coded 
Language, ITHACA J. (July 16, 2015, 2:10 PM), https://www.ithacajournal.com/story/opinion/readers/ 
2015/07/16/letter-project-objections-coded-language/30246187/ [https://perma.cc/LJ4V-54HW]. 
 176 Danielle Kurtzleben, Seeking Suburban Votes, Trump to Repeal Rule Combating Racial Bias in 
Housing, NPR (July 21, 2020, 1:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/21/893471887/seeking-suburban-
votes-trump-targets-rule-to-combat-racial-bias-in-housing [https://perma.cc/LMQ8-TPBV]; see also 
Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 14, 2020, 5:29 PM), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-press-conference-071420/ 
[https://perma.cc/QYM8-V4UE] (“I’ve been watching this for years in Westchester, coming from New 
York. They want low-income housing built in a neighborhood. Well, I’m ending that rule. . . . Mothers 
aren’t happy about that. Fathers aren’t happy about that. They worked hard to buy a house, and now 
they’re going to watch the housing values drop like a rock, and that has happened.”). 
 177 Einstein et al., supra note 153, at 29–30; see also Asad R. Khan, Decentralized Land-Use 
Regulation with Agglomeration Spillovers: Evidence from Aldermanic Privilege in Chicago 1–2 (Dec. 
2019) (Job Market Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), https://drive.google.com/ 
file/d/1d3E7kTF_1U71FRImdfUQ-YwjEOd9bLhV/view [https://perma.cc/7YTS-YJDV] (finding 
“strong political effects on zoning” and that “homeownership significantly predicts fewer and smaller 
zoning changes” in Chicago).  
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individuals express commitment to the ideal of integration in the abstract, 
they consistently resist integration in their own neighborhoods, especially in 
higher-income communities.178 Thus, in a prerogative regime today, if either 
the legislator or her constituency wants to block an affordable-housing 
proposal, the development will not proceed. 
III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Prerogative exists in cities across the entire country, its prevalence 
much wider than commonly realized. And though prerogative is not 
inherently problematic—indeed, some proponents have defended the 
practice as increasing legislator accountability to constituents179—the 
segregative costs driven by legislator vetoes of affordable housing bear 
addressing. Recognizing the need for reform, both academics and 
community advocates have offered various legislative proposals to curb 
prerogative. These proposals fit under two broad categories: electoral reform 
and land use reform. Electoral reforms propose changing the structure of 
local government such that prerogative’s influence diminishes. Land use 
reforms more narrowly target the specific procedures prerogative controls. 
The following Sections overview these two categories before ultimately 
discussing the challenges of both and the ensuing need for judicial 
intervention. 
A. Electoral Reform 
Some commenters propose reforms that target the very governmental 
structures that enable prerogative. These structural reforms rely on a theory 
that altering a legislator’s constituency will diminish prerogative’s 
 
 178 See, e.g., Jacqueline Rabe Thomas, Separated by Design: How Some of America’s Richest Towns 
Fight Affordable Housing, PROPUBLICA (May 22, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
how-some-of-americas-richest-towns-fight-affordable-housing [https://perma.cc/W3GY-BXWM] 
(describing how residents in high-income communities bemoan the potential development of affordable 
housing and use coded language). This resistance is not a new phenomenon either. For example, 
resistance to socioeconomic integration motivated the Austin neighborhood’s forced annexation to 
Chicago in 1899 after Austin residents voted to expand the “L” public transit “to the chagrin of Oak Park 
residents, who feared the arrival of inexpensive transportation would encourage working-class migration” 
into the neighboring communities. Michael Romain, Austin’s Strange Plight, AUSTIN WKLY. NEWS (Oct. 
22, 2019, 4:12 PM), https://www.austinweeklynews.com/News/Articles/10-22-2019/Austin's-strange-
plight-/ [https://perma.cc/CSW6-JBQC]. 
 179 See, e.g., Misra, supra note 5 (Alderman Carlos Ramirez-Rosa of Chicago’s 35th Ward arguing 
that aldermanic prerogative provides local accountability); Ruthhart, supra note 5 (2019 Chicago mayoral 
candidate Toni Preckwinkle arguing for prerogative’s local accountability); Morell, supra note 12 
(Alderman Tom Tunney of Chicago’s 44th Ward arguing for prerogative’s local accountability); PEW 
CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 35, at 1 (Philadelphia City Council President Darrell L. Clarke arguing for 
prerogative’s local accountability). 
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salience.180 One argument specifically looks to constituency size as a proxy 
for the breadth of pressures a legislator faces.181 If prerogative is a means of 
encouraging government to submit to hyperlocal pressures, decreasing the 
number of legislators would necessarily increase the number of constituents 
each legislator represents, thus increasing the breadth of pressures they face 
and “forcing council members to focus more on citywide interests.”182 
Accordingly, numerous commentators, including Ed Bachrach and Austin 
Berg, have proposed council contraction—reducing the number of 
legislators on the local legislative body.183 For example, for every one of St. 
Louis’s twenty-eight aldermen, there are roughly 10,500 residents,184 making 
the city’s number of representatives per capita one of the highest in the 
country.185 This fragmentation has led aldermen to focus on narrow decision-
making at the expense of citywide interests.186 Legislators increasingly weigh 
a policy’s impact on “smaller and smaller patches of turf.”187 Aldermanic 
 
 180 See BACHRACH & BERG, supra note 31, at 31 (arguing that replacing Chicago’s aldermanic ward 
system with a smaller city council will allow the council to tackle “big-picture, citywide policies”); see 
also METRIC GEOMETRY & GERRYMANDERING GRP., STUDY OF REFORM PROPOSALS FOR CHICAGO CITY 
COUNCIL 1 (2019), https://mggg.org/Chicago.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6WP-TZ59] [hereinafter MGGG 
STUDY] (explaining how prerogative combined with carefully crafted districts entrenches local 
legislators, rendering them unaccountable). 
 181 See THE CIVIC FED’N, supra note 58, at 69 (“A large council tends to focus more on constituent 
services and localized interests than on functioning as a legislative body that emphasizes policymaking 
and oversight. Smaller bodies are more focused on traditional legislative functions.”). 
 182 BACHRACH & BERG, supra note 31, at 21. For a discussion of contraction in relation to charter 
reform, see Ed Bachrach & Austin Berg, Opinion, Time to Reform Chicago Governance with a City 
Charter, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2019, 1:14 PM) [hereinafter Bachrach & Berg, Time to Reform], 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1122004/time-to-reform-chicago-governance-with-a-city-charter 
[https://perma.cc/63ZK-7YJL]. 
 183 BACHRACH & BERG, supra note 31, at 21; see also MGGG STUDY, supra note 180, at 1. City 
council contraction usually comes up in the fiscal context, but relatedly often hinges on issues of 
accountability, as demonstrated by the current debate in Cleveland. See Robert Higgs, Cleveland’s City 
Council Has More Members and Higher Pay than Most Comparable Cities, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER 
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.cleveland.com/news/erry-2018/11/9288790e0f7622/clevelands-city-
council-has-mo.html [https://perma.cc/E5YD-AWSP]. See generally Douglas Muzzio & Tim Tompkins, 
On the Size of the City Council: Finding the Mean, 37 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 83 (1989) (summarizing 
the effects of different local legislature sizes on representation and values like accountability and 
participation). 
 184 This is based on an estimated current population of 293,792. St. Louis, Missouri Population 2020, 
WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/st-louis-population/ 
[https://perma.cc/3JUS-8MZH].  
 185 Scott Ogilvie, Comment, Reduce the Size of the Board of Aldermen, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (May 10, 
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2018/05/10/commentary-reduce-the-size-of-
the-board-of.html [https://perma.cc/3NQ9-E3WQ]. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Harney, supra note 127. 
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contraction may loosen prerogative’s hold by making each legislator 
accountable to a larger number of constituents. 
Another theory argues that single-member districts enable 
prerogative.188 In single-member districts, a city council or administrative 
agency can defer to an individual legislator since a lone representative 
creates a singular point of accountability.189 Academics therefore suggest—
sometimes in conjunction with contraction—that cities adopt multimember 
districts.190 Because prerogative only arises in single-member contexts, 
switching to a multimember structure would promote shared accountability 
since councils could no longer defer to a single legislator.191 Furthermore, 
like contraction, such a change would “provide a jolt to the system” by 
changing the constituents and potential coalitions of long-serving 
incumbents.192 In short, such reform would ideally end the fiefdom-like 
nature of prerogative.193 
Though they might provide other normative benefits, none of these 
electoral-reform proposals would necessarily eliminate prerogative’s deep-
rooted grip. Aldermanic contraction might incentivize legislators to advocate 
for a broader geographical constituency, but it will not undermine 
prerogative itself. Even if a city like St. Louis halved its number of aldermen 
to fourteen, those legislators might still exercise prerogative, just on behalf 
of a larger constituency.194 Similarly, multimember district representatives 
could still wield their veto power collectively. Or legislative bodies could 
 
 188 See Michael Hankinson & Asya Magazinnik, Aggregating Voters and the Electoral Connection: 
The Effect of District Representation on the Distributive Equity of the Housing Supply 2 (Working Paper, 
2019), chriswarshaw.com/lpe_conference/draft_190820.pdf [https://perma.cc/57DU-H2AZ]; see also 
James C. Clingermayer, Electoral Representation, Zoning Politics, and the Exclusion of Group Homes, 
47 POL. RSCH. Q. 969, 979 (1994) (arguing that at-large representatives “may be more open to the 
influence of interests that may or may not be in tune with the preferences of their voters”). 
 189 See Hankinson & Magazinnik, supra note 188, at 2. 
 190 See, e.g., MGGG STUDY, supra note 180, at 2. 
 191 Id. at 21; see also Hankinson & Magazinnik, supra note 188, at 28 (finding that shifting from at-
large to district elections makes it harder to permit multifamily housing, but creates housing that is more 
affordable and less concentrated, in part because “local interests have greater influence at the expense of 
collective, citywide outcomes”). But see Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, Local Logrolling? 
Assessing the Impact of Legislative Districting in Los Angeles, 50 URB. AFFS. REV. 648, 664 (2014) 
(finding that while council members in single-member districts defer to their colleagues, their deference 
is conditional and legislators will still consider citywide interests, especially on more contentious 
matters). 
 192 MGGG STUDY, supra note 180, at 21. 
 193 Id. at 22. 
 194 Similarly, if the city council in a large city like Chicago was cut in half to twenty-five aldermen, 
nothing would prevent a single alderman representing twice as many residents from exercising 
prerogative. To this point, each New York City council member represents a constituency roughly three 
times the size of a Chicago alderman. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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adopt a policy of rejecting proposals that fail to command support from all 
representatives of a particular multimember district, thus enabling legislators 
to still exercise an individual veto. 
Modifying the multimember proposal to instead switch some district-
specific seats to at-large representation similarly does not specifically 
address prerogative. Although at-large representation may provide an initial 
systemic jolt and promote shared accountability, the presence of at-large 
legislators would not necessarily remove veto power from district-specific 
representatives. Philadelphia, for instance, has both at-large and district-
based council members, yet prerogative still thrives.195 Moreover, such 
redistricting also fails to account for the historical structural exclusion of 
racial minorities within at-large electoral systems, which in some 
jurisdictions legally prompted the shift to single-member districts.196 
Pragmatic concerns also caution against electoral reform. For one, 
electoral reform sweeps far more broadly than land use reform. Both 
aldermanic contraction and shifting to multimember districts involve major 
rebalancing of electoral power directly impacting incumbents, which is one 
reason why contraction rarely occurs: few legislators will vote to eliminate 
their own seat.197 Alternatively, reforming the land use planning process is 
narrower. Land use reform does not implicate incumbency, one of the 
foremost concerns of legislators.198 More promising legislative reform likely 
targets legislators’ decision-making processes at a more granular level. 
B. Land Use Reform 
Academics and community advocates have thus offered ideas for 
legislative reforms that strike more surgically at the logrolling—i.e., the 
 
 195 See supra Section I.B. 
 196 See, e.g., Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050, 1077 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (holding that “one 
of the principal motivating factors for the at-large election system for the Mobile City Commission was 
the purpose (intent) to discriminate against blacks”); Melissa J. Marschall, Anirudh V.S. Ruhil & Paru R. 
Shah, The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local Legislatures, 
54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 107, 122 (2010) (finding that increasing city council size can increase Black 
representation and finding a lower threshold of Black representation in single-member districts than in 
multimember districts). But see MGGG STUDY, supra note 180, at 3 (warning of the potential for plurality 
voting to lead to vote-splitting). 
 197 See Muzzio & Tompkins, supra note 183, at 88 (“Legislatures, when left to their own devices, 
almost always expand rather than diminish in size.”). 
 198 See Rebekah Herrick, Michael K. Moore & John R. Hibbing, Unfastening the Electoral 
Connection: The Behavior of U.S. Representatives when Reelection Is No Longer a Factor, 56 J. POL. 
214, 225–26 (1994) (finding that legislator activity is motivated by a reelection agenda). 
115:549 (2020) Prerogative and Legislator Vetoes 
581 
mutual exchange of deference—inherent in prerogative.199 One can construe 
prerogative as a prisoner’s dilemma of distributive politics: legislators defer 
to other legislators out of fear that their own preferences will not be honored. 
Accordingly, one reform proposal is for cities to engage in binding 
centralized planning.200 Professors Roderick Hills, Jr. and David Schleicher 
argue that binding planning would consist of one-time, citywide land use 
determinations with onerous procedures for future alteration, thereby 
“deter[ring] parcel-specific deals from causing the multi-neighborhood 
bargain over land uses to unravel.”201 The appeal of central planning is that 
it overcomes the prisoner’s dilemma: legislators would no longer face 
multiple land use votes where failure to defer could jeopardize their own 
prerogative.202 Furthermore, a centralized plan could account for the 
historical inequities in development, encouraging legislators to act with 
citywide interests in mind, even when specific constituencies oppose 
affordable development.203 
Professors Hills and Schleicher have also argued for the use of 
transferrable development rights (TDRs), which allow property owners to 
sell their unused development rights—such as building higher or at increased 
density—to other property owners.204 Although not addressing prerogative 
head on, these scholars argue that TDR programs can transform the 
constituency pressures that motivate a local legislator to wield her 
prerogative.205 First, TDRs can enlarge the constituency base that actively 
supports housing growth by appealing to both developers and 
preservationists alike—two constituencies normally at odds with each 
other.206 TDRs provide political cover for both camps, since they can each 
herald the benefits of new development at the recipient parcel while also 
applauding the preservation of the sending parcel.207 Second, TDRs can 
 
 199 See Editorial Board, Mayor Lightfoot and the Machine, supra note 9 (describing prerogative as 
“akin to Washington, D.C., logrolling but murkier”). 
 200 See Hills & Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, supra note 29, at 108–15; CHI. AREA FAIR 
HOUS. ALL., supra note 58, at 68–69; Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 18–19. 
 201 Hills & Schleicher, Planning an Affordable City, supra note 29, at 110. 
 202 Id. at 112–14 (“[M]embers of a party-less legislature ‘distribute’ goods broadly across electoral 
districts to minimize their risk of being excluded from the necessarily fluid and unpredictable winning 
coalition.”). 
 203 CHI. AREA FAIR HOUS. ALL., supra note 58, at 69; see also Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 18 
(describing how a centralized city plan should work to rectify historical inequities). 
 204 Hills & Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air, supra note 83, at 4. 
 205 See id. at 40–42. 
 206 Id. at 4, 42–43; see also CROWLEY & PELLETIERE, supra note 140 (overviewing the debate 
between preservation and mobility among affordable housing advocates). 
 207 Hills & Schleicher, Building Coalitions out of Thin Air, supra note 83, at 43. 
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diminish the political power of those who oppose development by 
undermining the “entitlement to zoning restrictions” that these opponents 
rely on when arguing for maintaining the status quo.208 In short, TDR 
programs can—in a perfect world—“transcend the acrimony of growth 
control politics,”209 thereby reducing the likelihood that a legislator would 
exercise a veto through prerogative. Nonetheless, while TDRs potentially 
expand the coalition supporting affordable housing development, the 
underlying incentives for developers still remain—namely the bottom line.210 
A third proposal targets prerogative’s grip on committee procedure. 
One of the ways in which legislative bodies honor prerogative is through 
inaction: when an ordinance is referred to committee, if the legislator 
exercising her prerogative does not want the ordinance to move forward, 
parliamentary procedure allows the committee to indefinitely table the 
ordinance, effectively killing it.211 Thus, Chicago housing advocates, 
including Patricia Fron, Marisa Novara, and Kate Walz, propose 
transforming inaction into approval for affordable developments in districts 
without sufficient affordable housing and further requiring vetoes to include 
transparent explanations.212 Additionally, these advocates propose creating a 
review process for committee decision-making to increase transparency.213 
 
 208 Id. at 44. 
 209 Id. at 4. 
 210 Id. at 30 (“Requiring developers to buy both TDRs and, say, build affordable housing may mean 
that developments will not ‘pencil’ (that is, be profitable enough to build).”). 
 211 See Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 13; see also, e.g., Maya Dukmasova, Lost Battle on Affordable 
Housing Means War on Aldermanic Prerogative Will Continue, CHI. READER (June 26, 2018, 5:49 PM), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2018/06/26/lost-battle-on-affordable-housing-means-
war-on-aldermanic-prerogative-will-continue [https://perma.cc/K7UZ-A737] (describing an affordable 
development effectively blocked when “the zoning committee indefinitely tabled a vote”). 
 212 SHRIVER CTR. ON POVERTY L. & CHI. AREA FAIR HOUS. ALL., WORKING TOWARD A HEALED 
CITY: HOW CHICAGO CAN BUILD EQUITABLE COMMUNITIES FROM THE GROUND UP 11 (2019), 
https://www.povertylaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/2019_09_24_Working_Toward_A_Healed_Ci
ty-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3KS-8474]. For a proposed ordinance illustrating this reform, see Chi., Ill., 
O2018-6119, Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance (July 25, 2018). For background on this proposal, 
see Marisa Novara, When Local Control Goes Wrong, METRO. PLAN. COUNCIL (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.metroplanning.org/news/8552/When-Local-Control-Goes-Wrong [https://perma.cc/4MY4-
MZJG], for an explanation that the proposal would avoid “forcing developers to abandon their plans 
without ever actually being told no.” See Charles Isaacs, Environmental Justice in Little Village: A Case 
for Reforming Chicago’s Zoning Law, 15 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 357, 400 (2020), for arguments that 
Chicago agencies and legislators should publish the “rationale for decisions on rezoning applications.” 
 213 Chi., Ill., Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance, supra note 212 (mandating that any appeal 
decision “must be accompanied by written findings of fact specifying the reasons for the decision”); 
METRO. PLAN. COUNCIL, OUR EQUITABLE FUTURE: A ROADMAP FOR THE CHICAGO REGION 12 (2018), 
https://www.metroplanning.org/uploads/cms/documents/cost-of-segregation-roadmap.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/LSX7-HHMU] (recommending that “when a residential development with at least 10 
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Transparency and accountability underlie these reforms—ideally, objectivity 
would displace prerogative’s subjectivity.214 
Lastly, Professor Nestor Davidson has shown how city charter revision 
can be a mechanism for systemic change.215 Revising a city’s charter would 
not necessarily change the city’s land use determinations with regard to any 
particular parcel.216 Revised charters, however, could enshrine ideals such as 
equitable housing and transparent governance, thereby providing a hook for 
judicial review if legislative bodies fail to live up to these ideals.217 Like 
centralized planning, city charters necessarily focus on citywide issues rather 
than hyperlocal issues. Charter revision therefore avoids the prisoner’s 
dilemma of prerogative.218 But unless city legislators specifically revise their 
charters to prohibit prerogative—a potentially impossible task when 
prerogative exists as an unwritten tradition given its quid-pro-quo nature—
prerogative’s more pernicious tendencies may continue. 
One difficulty with reforming land use processes is that these changes 
may not sufficiently account for dynamic reactions.219 Across all proposals—
centralized planning, TDR zones, committee accountability, and charter 
revision—market and political actors can shift their responsive timeframe to 
an earlier point in the decision-making process.220 For example, rather than 
exercising prerogative at the time of a zoning decision, legislators may 
instead exercise prerogative at the adoption of the plan.221 Furthermore, 
 
percent affordability is proposed in a ward with less than 10 percent affordable housing, the proposed 
development can no longer be rejected or delayed indefinitely by the Alderman alone”). 
 214 Walz & Fron, supra note 28, at 20. 
 215 Nestor M. Davidson, Local Constitutions, 99 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 
20–23) (on file with journal) (describing how some charters address governance processes and individual 
rights like housing opportunity). Such a proposal requires a city charter, which would exclude Chicago. 
Of the fifteen most populous cities, only Chicago and Indianapolis do not have charters. For a discussion 
of charter creation and governance reform, see Bachrach & Berg, Time to Reform, supra note 182. 
 216 Davidson, supra note 215, at 48 (arguing that communities should only address “charter-worthy” 
issues in their charters, like “[c]ore questions of structure and political process”). 
 217 Id. at 38, 42 (arguing charters can enshrine provisions that “reflect a community’s deepest values” 
that courts can subsequently afford “greater deference”). 
 218 Id. at 38. 
 219 Just as omnibus appropriations legislation that consolidates most government spending into a 
one-time vote faces interest group lobbying, so too would centralized land use decision-making. See 
Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 33, at 1717. 
 220 See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 91, 100–02 (2014) 
(describing the “multiple pressure points for anti-development activists to block developments”). For 
example, in Baltimore County, the council banned campaign contributions during the one-year period 
when the county’s zoning map is adopted in an effort to diminish the “pay to play” culture enabled by 
prerogative; however, “a would-be developer seeking to gain favor with a council member simply has to 
make a campaign contribution before the formal process begins.” Plymyer, supra note 93. 
 221 Id. 
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especially for centralized planning, changes to procedure almost always 
create processes for variances that can be exploited—rules beget exceptions. 
Committee accountability similarly does not guarantee a solution, as 
legislators can always explain votes with pretextual reasoning. But above all, 
like electoral reform, political inertia animates the most pressing concern. 
Even targeted land use reform faces the uphill battle of stripping legislators 
of historically wielded power that purportedly fosters accountability. 
IV. JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS 
Electoral and land use reforms could indeed improve upon the status 
quo, but their passage faces strong political headwinds. A legislative body 
will hesitate to voluntarily curb its own power, especially when the body can 
always invoke local expertise and accountability as justifications for the 
power.222 Judicial intervention as an alternative solution, particularly in the 
wake of legislative inaction, therefore merits serious consideration. Basic 
principles of majoritarian government normally dictate against judicial 
intervention. Our system of government commands that decisions be made 
according to the democratic process.223 Still, it has long been recognized that 
courts must intervene to ensure the soundness of the democratic process 
when that process grows distorted as a structural matter.224 Intervention to 
curtail prerogative regimes satisfies this justification. 
 
 222 “Any proposal to change prerogative is sure to face stiff opposition within City Council, which 
considers the practice as fundamental a duty as passing an annual budget . . . . It is not going away anytime 
soon. The question is whether prerogative can be made a more open process so that the public can better 
examine the way it is used and its impact on Philadelphia’s future.” PEW CHARITABLE TRS., supra note 
35, at 23; see also Cate Plys, Council Whores, CHI. READER (July 17, 1997), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/council-whores/Content?oid=893889 [https://perma.cc/6XNR-
6KVL] (examining Chicago’s efforts at ethics reform in the ’90s). 
 223 In principle, the democratic process ought to self-correct since unfavored legislation elicits a 
negative public response. David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 
1256–57; see also JONATHAN SUMPTION, TRIALS OF THE STATE: LAW AND THE DECLINE OF POLITICS 
41–42 (2019) (arguing the judicial resolution of policy disputes “undermine[s] the single biggest 
advantage of the political process, which is to accommodate the divergent interests and opinions of 
citizens”). 
 224 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Though secondary to 
structural distortion, the case might also be made for justification under the Carolene Products discrete 
and insular minority rationale. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 135–36 (1980); ADAM COHEN, SUPREME INEQUALITY: THE SUPREME COURT’S FIFTY-
YEAR BATTLE FOR A MORE UNJUST AMERICA 6–8 (2020) (overviewing the historical consideration of 
socioeconomic status qualifying as a discrete and insular minority when poor people “were often 
physically segregated, in urban ghettos or on the ‘wrong’ side of the tracks”). If one construes prerogative 
as a civil rights issue—a minor inferential jump given prerogative’s segregative impact—then the idea of 
judicial intervention seems even less remarkable, as advancing civil rights has long required judicial 
intervention as a precursor to legislative action, even when the latter might be considered a more 
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Prerogative threatens the democratic process in two ways. First, 
legislators subvert the democratic participatory process when they wield 
prerogative at the behest of an entrenched majority—where wealthier, whiter 
districts consistently reject the development of affordable housing in their 
midst.225 Second, addressing prerogative necessarily implicates reform of the 
legislative process itself, which often does not proceed even when a majority 
supports it.226 Thus, turning to the courts becomes appropriate, either as a 
temporary solution or as an external catalyst for legislative action.227 
Although judicial intervention holds promise, few suits have challenged 
prerogative at all, and even fewer have targeted its segregative impact. This 
dearth of case law poses challenges for litigators and activists seeking to 
challenge prerogative. The following Sections explore this limited case law, 
thereby laying the groundwork for future research and litigation efforts. The 
first Section examines recent legal claims brought by individual developers 
and businesses upset with a specific local decision guided by prerogative. 
These cases highlight the difficulty of challenging prerogative when it exists 
as an unwritten tradition. The second Section discusses burgeoning legal 
efforts to challenge prerogative at a systemic level, particularly in relation to 
its impact on affordable housing development. A lawsuit in Los Angeles 
successfully prompted legislators to curb their own prerogative, though 
prerogative there existed in codified form. Conversely, in Chicago, one legal 
 
legitimate means of lasting change. See generally David S. Meyer & Steven A. Boutcher, Signals and 
Spillover: Brown v. Board of Education and Other Social Movements, 5 PERSPS. ON POL. 81 (2007) 
(juxtaposing the social movements of education integration and marriage equality in their respective uses 
of litigation as a means of pressuring legislative change). 
 225 See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1386 (2014) (describing an entrenched 
majority where policies fail to “reflect[] the balanced aggregate preferences of residents, because the 
preferences of some will always be kept outside the decision-making calculus”); see also Michael J. 
Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 498 (1997) 
(arguing for judicial review in the case of “cross-temporal” majority entrenchment, where political 
majorities seek to perpetuate their power beyond their time in the majority). 
 226 For example, the proposed Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance in Chicago failed to pass out 
of committee despite having twenty-seven sponsors—a majority of the City Council. See Chi., Ill., 
Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance, supra note 212. See generally Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Mending the 
Legislative Process – The Preliminaries, 3 THEORY & PRAC. LEG. 245 (2015) (summarizing challenges 
to reforming legislative processes). 
 227 See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-thinking the Judicial Role in New 
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 570–75 (2007) (arguing judicial review of majoritarian decision-
making processes can prompt nonjudicial action); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: 
Strategies of Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 805, 846–48 (1990) (describing the 
judiciary’s capacity to “unlock organizational stasis” in the prison context). 
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challenge has failed, another administrative complaint remains ongoing, and 
legislative action has thus far stalled.228 
A. Individual Challenges 
Most case law discussing prerogative consists of individuals 
challenging singular land use decisions that resulted from prerogative 
deference, rather than systemic challenges to prerogative regimes in their 
entirety. Nonetheless, these individual legal challenges still remain few and 
far between. One theme that emerges after analyzing these cases is the 
difficulty of finding municipal liability through a § 1983 claim, as first 
established by Monell v. Department of Social Services.229 Section 1983 
exists to vindicate the violation of constitutional rights, but Monell and its 
progeny have protected municipalities by creating a high bar for liability.230 
Accordingly, not only must a plaintiff prove a land use decision violated their 
constitutional rights, but to hold the municipality liable, she must also prove 
the legislator wielded prerogative with final policymaking authority or acted 
pursuant to an official city policy or custom.231 The typical unwritten nature 
of prerogative makes these Monell claims particularly difficult to prove. The 
following cases illustrate this tension and include claims based on equal 
protection, substantive due process, procedural due process, and First 
Amendment violations. 
In 2009, Chicago’s Congress Hotel sued Second Ward Alderman Bob 
Fioretti.232 The hotel alleged Fioretti had impermissibly refused to issue 
permits to operate a sidewalk cafe in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection by wielding his aldermanic 
prerogative.233 The court’s opinion grappled with whether Fioretti’s actions 
 
 228 See Chi., Ill., Affordable Housing Equity Ordinance, supra note 212; infra notes 277–303 and 
accompanying text. 
 229 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). These claims against municipalities under § 1983 are often called 
Monell claims. 
 230 See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 914–20 (2015) (overviewing local government liability in Monell claims). 
 231 Id. at 914–16. Justice Stephen Breyer has noted Monell liability “is neither readily understandable 
nor easy to apply.” Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 433 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 232 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs. v. Fioretti (520 S. Mich. Ave. II), No. 07 C 4245, 2009 WL 3151794, 
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2009). One of the other earliest recognitions of prerogative by a court in Chicago 
occurred in the bankruptcy context. See In re J.S. II, L.L.C., No. 07 B 3856, 2007 WL 4233090, at *4 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2007) (detailing the existence of aldermanic privilege and its alleged 
relationship to the real estate involved in the bankruptcy). 
 233 520 S. Mich. Ave. II, 2009 WL 3151794, at *1. The hotel also alleged a due process violation, 
which was dismissed because of a lack of a property interest, as well as a National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) violation because it believed Fioretti had improperly used his aldermanic authority to force the 
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could be attached to the city as a matter of final policymaking authority.234 
The court recognized that a strict textual reading of the city Code meant 
aldermen did not have absolute permitting power.235 But given the immense 
evidence of prerogative’s impact—historical examples of permitting 
additions to committee meeting agendas conditional on aldermanic 
support,236 expert testimony from a veteran land use attorney,237 and 
testimony from Fioretti about the deference he received238—the court found 
the city council had effectively delegated final policymaking authority to the 
alderman.239 Nonetheless, the hotel lost on the equal protection claim because 
it failed to prove that Fioretti had intentionally treated the hotel differently 
than other businesses with sidewalk cafes.240 
In Waterfront Renaissance Associates v. City of Philadelphia, a 
development company challenged a building-height-restriction ordinance as 
an unconstitutional violation of its substantive due process rights.241 Like 
Chicago in the Congress Hotel case, Philadelphia argued that it could not be 
held liable for the actions of a single council member because he was not 
acting pursuant to a city policy or custom as required by Monell, but the court 
disagreed.242 In denying the motion to dismiss, the court held the height-
restriction ordinance had passed because of councilmanic prerogative, a 
finding that cited a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision from three years 
earlier that had grappled with whether “deliberate inaction” could result from 
 
hotel to settle its union dispute. 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs. v. Fioretti (520 S. Mich. Ave. I), No. 07 C 
4245, 2008 WL 4831730, at *1–3, *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2008). 
 234 520 S. Mich. Ave. II, 2009 WL 3151794, at *1–2. 
 235 Id. at *2 (finding aldermanic “power is ostensibly limited by the Municipal Code’s admonition 
that aldermen ‘not unreasonably with[o]ld’ approval and its requirement that the City Council vote on all 
permit ordinances” (quoting CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 10–28–805)). 
 236 Id. at *3–4. 
 237 Id. at *6–7. 
 238 Id. at *7. 
 239 Id. at *10. More recently, in a 2018 case concerning retaliatory downzoning, the Northern District 
of Illinois entertained the notion that aldermanic privilege gave the defendant alderman de facto final 
policymaking authority; however, the court dismissed the claim because the rest of the complaint 
contradicted this notion of de facto authority. Strauss v. City of Chicago, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1209 
(N.D. Ill. 2018). 
 240 520 S. Mich. Ave. I, 2009 WL 3151794, at *11. The plaintiff did, however, win on its NLRA 
claim, receiving an injunction enjoining the city from interfering with the hotel’s labor negotiations. Id. 
at *19. 
 241 701 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637–38 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 242 Id. at 641. 
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prerogative.243 Thus, because prerogative represented official policy, the 
Waterfront Renaissance Associates court held that the city could be liable 
for the actions of council members acting pursuant to prerogative.244 
In a rare case challenging prerogative outside of Chicago or 
Philadelphia, a Tennessee developer sued Nashville, the region’s housing 
agency, and relevant council members when the defendants refused to grant 
a necessary zoning change.245 The plaintiff’s procedural due process claim 
argued that the regional housing agency refused to grant necessary 
permissions until it first received approval from the property’s local council 
member.246 Furthermore, the plaintiff argued the agency withdrew the zoning 
request without an opportunity for the plaintiff to be heard.247 In granting the 
agency’s motion to dismiss, the court held the plaintiff had failed to establish 
a property interest.248 The court pointed to the metropolitan council’s 
“discretionary” power over the zoning process as laid out in the city Code, 
meaning no property interest existed.249 The court, however, failed to 
consider whether prerogative might undermine that “discretionary” power at 
the council level, such that the zoning process could potentially entail a 
cognizable property interest. 
Developers have also relied on First Amendment retaliation claims to 
challenge prerogative as applied to their land use requests.250 One of the most 
 
 243 Id. at 642 n.8 (citing HSP Gaming, LP v. City Council, 939 A.2d 273, 283 (Pa. 2007)); see also 
Phila. Ent. & Dev. Partners L.P. v. City Council, 943 A.2d 955, 965 (Pa. 2008) (supporting the 
councilmanic courtesy finding in HSP Gaming). 
 244 701 F. Supp. 2d at 642 n.8. Ultimately, the court dismissed the claims as moot after an amendment 
removed the height restrictions. CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 617 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
 245 Vision Real Est. Inv. Corp. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:18-cv-00014, 
2019 WL 4748386, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2019). 
 246 Id. at *9. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. This failure, notably, was based on the city’s ability to exercise discretion in rescinding a 
benefit through the rezoning process, rather than being based on the existence of the benefit itself. Cf. 
Bayview-Lofberg’s, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 905 F.2d 142, 146 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying a procedural 
due process claim based on a liquor-license denial associated with prerogative because there was no 
conferred benefit). 
 249 Vision Real Est., 2019 WL 4748386, at *9. 
 250 These claims assert that “the government’s exercise of an ostensibly neutral power has been 
undertaken in retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights.” 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE 
B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:14 (1994). One of the earliest cases 
challenging aldermanic prerogative in Chicago also consisted of a First Amendment retaliation challenge. 
Norflo Holding Corp. v. City of Chicago, No. 00 C 6208, 2002 WL 453605 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2002). 
The court’s decision in that case highlighted a difficulty in challenging prerogative: because the alderman 
never actually exercised her prerogative, the practice’s mere existence as a threat was insufficient to 
establish municipal liability. Id. at *6. 
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recent cases illustrating this type of claim is Feibush v. Johnson.251 A 
Philadelphia developer argued that a council member retaliated against him 
by exercising prerogative to block the sale of two city-owned lots.252 The 
developer claimed that the retaliation was political: both men were running 
for the same council seat.253 Notably, the parties stipulated that councilmanic 
prerogative is an official custom in Philadelphia.254 The court found that the 
plaintiff had sufficiently proven the retaliation claim;255 however, the 
decision hinged on whether prerogative itself was the source of the injury, a 
finding necessary for liability to attach.256 The council member, Johnson, 
argued that prerogative did not cause the injury because his retaliation 
constituted a solely personal decision.257 The court rejected Johnson’s 
argument, relying on evidence demonstrating the ironclad nature of 
prerogative in Philadelphia.258 Although any council member could introduce 
the requisite resolution for the sale of a city-owned lot, prerogative’s grip 
was so strong that the executive director of the city’s development authority 
testified that he “could not recall any instance in which a Councilmember 
other than Johnson introduced a resolution to approve the sale of City-owned 
land in Johnson’s district.”259 Thus, because prerogative ensured the 
defendant’s colleagues’ deference, the retaliation that injured the plaintiff 
was rooted in a government policy.260 
B. Systemic Challenges 
In recent cases in Los Angeles and Chicago, plaintiffs have levied 
systemic claims against prerogative. While the Los Angeles suit successfully 
induced legislators to curb their own prerogative, Chicago plaintiffs have had 
less success, demonstrating the difficulty of challenging prerogative at a 
systemic level when it exists as an unwritten tradition. In July 2018, a 
coalition called the Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment 
 
 251 203 F. Supp. 3d 489 (E.D. Pa. 2016). The defendant in this case is also the same council member 
recently indicted by federal prosecutors at the beginning of 2020. See supra notes 79–82 and 
accompanying text. 
 252 Feibush, 203 F. Supp. at 491. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. at 496. It is possible this stipulation was driven by the HSP Gaming decision. See supra note 
243 and accompanying text. 
 255 Feibush, 203 F. Supp. at 496. 
 256 Id. at 496–97. 
 257 Id. at 497. 
 258 Id. at 498. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
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(ACCE Action) filed a lawsuit in California’s Superior Court for the County 
of Los Angeles challenging a codified version of prerogative in Los 
Angeles.261 The complaint alleged that city council members exercised 
prerogative in a segregative manner by withholding their support from the 
award of city financing for affordable housing development in their 
districts.262 The complaint grounded these allegations in seven specific 
causes of action, most of which were based on noncompliance with state 
law.263 But one claim stood out as potentially applicable beyond California: 
impermissible delegation of police and municipal powers to individual 
council members.264 
Because the city agency administering public funding for affordable 
developments required letters of acknowledgment signed by the council 
member of the district in which the proposed development sits, the 
administrative agency’s deference to hyperlocal control created the 
conditions for a “pocket veto,” i.e., legislator veto.265 In short, prerogative 
exercised through the letters of acknowledgment “provide[d] a mechanism 
by which discriminatory sentiments [could] . . . influence, obstruct, and 
prevent the siting of affordable and supportive housing in the City.”266 ACCE 
Action sought to enjoin the practice.267 The coalition argued the city had 
“maintain[ed] racial and economic residential segregation throughout Los 
Angeles by permitting individual councilmembers to limit mobility of low 
income individuals into the neighborhoods they represent.”268 
The lawsuit built upon mounting pressure for the city to curb its council 
members’ hyperlocal control.269 Just a few months prior to the case’s official 
filing, the Los Angeles Times editorial board called for an end to the 
 
 261 Complaint at 2–4, All. of Californians for Cmty. Empowerment v. City of Los Angeles, No. 
BS174427 (L.A. Super. Ct., July 26, 2018) [hereinafter ACCE Action 
Complaint], http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/1043.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VZR-RQWL]. 
 262 The lawsuit cited both affordable housing as well as “supportive housing”—a Los Angeles city 
initiative, Proposition HHH, approved by voters in 2016 to address the homelessness crisis. Id. at 2–3. 
 263 ACCE Action pled two counts of noncompliance with California nondiscrimination law, two 
counts of noncompliance with California’s Housing Element Law, one count of impermissible police and 
municipal powers delegation, one count of violating the state constitution’s equal protection guarantee, 
and one count of violating the state’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. Id. at 38–45. 
 264 See id. at 42–43; see also infra notes 307–308 and accompanying text (discussing the viability of 
future challenges to prerogative). 
 265 ACCE Action Complaint, supra note 261, at 3–4. 
 266 Id. at 24. 
 267 Id. at 45. 
 268 Id. at 4–5. 
 269 See generally SHAW, supra note 26, at 60–62 (describing public reaction to the letter-of-
acknowledgement requirement). 
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practice.270 The editorial recognized the benefits of local input from the city 
council, noting that “a developer would be foolish not to consult with a 
council member throughout the process.”271 But the editorial nonetheless 
concluded the costs outweighed the benefits since prerogative enables 
“unlimited discretion” by allowing a legislator “to scuttle a project up front 
for whatever reasons the member chooses.”272 Just days after ACCE Action 
filed the complaint, the editorial board wrote again, calling on city officials 
to act “before a judge makes them.”273 The California state legislature added 
to this pressure by passing legislation permitting certain affordable housing 
projects to bypass local approval processes, such as Los Angeles’ letter-of-
acknowledgement requirement.274 Because of this pressure, the Los Angeles 
city council voted to formally end the letter-of-acknowledgment requirement 
only six months after the lawsuit began.275 The city council’s vote therefore 
achieved what ACCE Action’s lawsuit initially set out to do: curb 
prerogative giving rise to a legislator veto.276 
In United States ex rel. Hanna v. City of Chicago, a resident sued the 
city using a whistleblower statute, alleging Chicago had violated the False 
Claims Act (FCA) by wrongfully certifying compliance with federal civil 
rights requirements when it had increased, rather than reduced, racial 
segregation in the city.277 Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Fair Housing Act, the plaintiff alleged the city did not meet its federal 
obligation to affirmatively further fair housing when it knowingly 
 
 270 Editorial Board, L.A. City Council Members Shouldn’t Have the Power to Veto Homeless Housing 
Projects at a Whim, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018, 4:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/ 
la-ed-homeless-housing-hhh-letter-20180317-story.html [https://perma.cc/ZAB7-ZE9V]. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
 273 Editorial Board, L.A. City Council Members Don’t Deserve Unilateral Veto Power over Homeless 
Projects They Don’t Like, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018, 4:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/ 
opinion/editorials/la-ed-homeless-housing-letter-lawsuit-20180801-story.html [https://perma.cc/8EDB-
GE5Y]. 
 274 See Assem. B. 2162, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); Katy Murphy, California Bill to Speed 
Housing for the Homeless Signed into Law, MARIN INDEP. J. (Sept. 26, 2018, 5:43 PM), 
https://www.marinij.com/2018/09/26/california-bill-to-fast-track-housing-for-the-homeless-signed-into-
law/ [https://perma.cc/S9F3-KHUZ]. 
 275  L.A., Cal., Ordinance 18-0955 (Oct. 9, 2018) (motion); L.A., Cal., Ordinance 18-0955 (Oct. 17, 
2018) (council file), https://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/index.cfm?fa=vcfi.dsp_ 
CFMS_Report&rptid=99&cfnumber=18-0955 [https://perma.cc/PUW2-QCA8]. 
 276 See Lawsuit Successfully Halts Illegal Pocket Veto Used to Block Supportive and Affordable 
Housing Projects in Los Angeles, ROSEN BIEN GALVAN & GRUNFELD LLP (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://rbgg.com/lawsuit-successfully-halts-illegal-pocket-veto-used-to-block-supportive-and-
affordable-housing-projects-in-los-angeles/ [https://perma.cc/4LAY-63JE]. 
 277 834 F.3d 775, 776 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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perpetuated existing patterns of racial segregation when siting affordable 
housing.278 The plaintiff argued that prerogative gave aldermen “full 
authority to determine whether and where affordable, multifamily rental 
housing” would be built in their wards and noted that, from 2006 to 2011, 
93% of the 2,600 approved affordable units were sited in low-income 
areas.279 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to grant the 
city’s motion to dismiss for insufficient particularity in the pleadings.280 
While the district court held that the plaintiff failed to prove intent on the 
city’s part,281 in reviewing the decision de novo, the Seventh Circuit upheld 
the decision on slightly different grounds, holding Hanna had not pleaded 
specifics such as the time, place, and method of the city’s alleged fraud.282 In 
a statement that might undermine the future use of FCA legal challenges to 
prerogative, the Seventh Circuit also questioned whether citizens with only 
publicly accessible information can bring such claims, since “the FCA is 
meant to encourage whistleblowing by insiders.”283 Thus, despite the 
plaintiff’s compelling data, the city prevailed. 
More recently, in November 2018 a coalition of fair housing 
organizations called the Chicago Area Fair Housing Alliance (CAFHA) 
partnered together to challenge aldermanic prerogative insofar as it 
perpetuates segregation through legislator vetoes.284 Rather than filing a 
traditional lawsuit in court, the coalition instead has chosen to pursue an 
administrative complaint through the U.S. Department for Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD).285 This type of complaint allows HUD to 
investigate the merits of a claim and share those findings while attempting 
to mediate the dispute through voluntary compliance or a conciliation 
 
 278 Id. at 776–77. 
 279 Id. at 777–78. 
 280 Id. at 776. Because Hanna brought a claim under the FCA, his complaint did not fall under the 
typical notice-pleading standard of Rule 8, but instead fell under the particularity standard of Rule 9(b). 
Id. at 778–79. 
 281 United States ex rel. Hanna v. City of Chicago, No. 11-CV-04885, 2015 WL 5461664, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 16, 2015), aff’d sub nom. 834 F.3d 775, 776 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 282 Hanna, 834 F.3d at 779–80. 
 283 Id. at 780. 
 284  HUD Administrative Complaint at 3, Chi. Area Fair Hous. All. v. City of Chicago (Nov. 15, 
2018) [hereinafter CAFHA Complaint], https://www.povertylaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/CAFHA-et.-al-v.-City-of-Chicago-HUD-Administrative-Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9WBM-QUAW]. 
 285 Id. at 19. 
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agreement.286 This strategy mirrored a successful HUD complaint in 
Maryland, where a regional coalition of fair housing organizations alleged 
that cities in the Baltimore metropolitan area used their local control over 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) funding to block affordable 
housing development, such that affordable housing was only built in 
predominantly minority areas.287 The Baltimore coalition eventually reached 
a conciliation agreement with Maryland, where the state agreed to equitably 
site and finance 1,500 affordable housing units.288 This settlement, however, 
only occurred after the Maryland state legislature amended its state law to 
eliminate the local veto in LIHTC allocation,289 an amendment that 
foreshadowed the IRS guidance previously discussed.290 Accordingly, the 
HUD settlement also included a provision mandating the state never reinstate 
the local-approval requirement.291 
Drawing on the Maryland HUD action, the CAFHA complaint invokes 
Chicago’s history of aldermen abusing their prerogative in the context of 
siting public housing.292 Like Hanna, the complaint also relied on statistical 
evidence demonstrating prerogative’s segregative influence. The complaint 
stated that from 1992 to 2017, Chicago approved loans for 3,394 affordable 
units, but 90% (3,052) of all those units were located in areas that were 
already predominantly nonwhite.293 Moreover, just five of Chicago’s fifty 
 
 286 If a violation is found, in some cases HUD will also bring a subsequent legal action. LIBBY PERL, 
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44557, THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: HUD OVERSIGHT, PROGRAMS, AND ACTIVITIES 
3–4 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44557.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RE2-ASER].  
 287  HUD Administrative Complaint at 3, Balt. Reg’l Hous. Campaign v. Maryland (Aug. 30, 2011) 
[hereinafter BRHC Complaint], https://www.prrac.org/pdf/BRHC_Complaint_2011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9VLH-CBPJ]. 
 288 Letter from Melody Taylor, Dir., Region III, Off. of Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, to Kenneth 
Holt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t for Hous. & Cmty. Dev. (Sept. 28, 2017) [hereinafter BRHC Settlement Letter], 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6406181/Maryland-LIHTC-settlement-with-HUD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3H2W-HLXE]. See generally Sarah Gantz, Maryland Reaches Fair Housing 
Agreement with Federal Government, BALT. SUN (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-fair-housing-maryland-20171003-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z7LS-X495] (summarizing the settlement). 
 289 See Multifamily Rental Housing Programs Efficiency Act, H.B. 453, Reg. Sess., § 4–213(b) (Md. 
2014), https://legiscan.com/MD/text/HB453/id/1012387/Maryland-2014-HB453-Chaptered.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RJZ5-XYFU]; Lawrence Lanahan, A Significant Victory: State Settles Maryland 
Housing Discrimination Complaint, Hundreds of Affordable Homes Promised, BALT. SUN (Oct. 11, 2017, 
12:26 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/citypaper/bcp-101117-mob-housing-settlement-20171010-
story.html [https://perma.cc/6U5C-PG52] (discussing events surrounding the settlement). 
 290 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 291 BRHC Settlement Letter, supra note 288, at 5. 
 292 See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907, 910 (N.D. Ill. 1969); CAFHA 
Complaint, supra note 284, at 7–8. 
 293 CAFHA Complaint, supra note 284, at 12–13. 
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wards accepted 59% of all units; conversely, twenty-seven wards did not 
accept a single unit.294 Unsurprisingly, those latter wards are 
disproportionately white and high-income.295 To further substantiate the data, 
CAFHA submitted multiple FOIA requests to the city seeking evidence of 
any affordable housing project that received funds without aldermanic 
support, and the city could not provide any proof.296 Given the practice’s 
segregative impact, CAFHA has alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act, 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and § 109 of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974.297 
Today, CAFHA’s complaint has yet to yield a settlement or any 
municipal legislation, as HUD continues to investigate. Notwithstanding this 
lack of action, in February 2020, state representatives in the Illinois General 
Assembly introduced a bill called the “End Aldermanic Privilege Law,”298 
similar to California’s legislation curtailing prerogative in Los Angeles.299 
The bill would curb aldermanic privilege in zoning approvals by giving 
developers a legal cause of action and imposing fines on Chicago.300 The 
bill’s future, however, is murky at best.301 Months after its introduction, the 
bill had yet to receive a cosponsor from the General Assembly’s Chicago 
 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. 
 296 Id. at 12. 
 297 Id. at 19–20. 
 298 End Aldermanic Privilege Law, H.B. 4484, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2020). On June 23, 2020 the 
bill was re-referred to the Rules Committee where, as of October 1, 2020, it remains. Bill Status of 
HB4484, ILL. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=4484&GAID=
15&DocTypeID=HB&LegId=124034&SessionID=108&GA=101 [https://perma.cc/J4KB-C8UC]. 
 299 See Murphy, supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 300  Bill Status of HB4484, supra note 298 (“[I]n the City of Chicago, a property owner, or a developer 
or contractor having the written permission of the property owner, shall not have any approvals under the 
Zoning Division denied because of an aldermanic hold, objection, extra-judicial or extra-legal request 
. . . . Allows suit against the State or the City of Chicago that seeks to enforce or impose a more restrictive 
law, regulation, ordinance, or resolution against the property owner, developer, or contractor and allows 
for a $5,000 civil penalty and other damages if the property owner’s, developer’s, or contractor’s claim 
is successful.”). 
 301 See Heather Cherone, Suburban Lawmaker Introduces Bill to End Aldermanic Prerogative in 
Chicago, DAILY LINE (Feb. 5, 2020), https://thedailyline.net/chicago/02/05/2020/suburban-lawmaker-
introduces-bill-to-end-aldermanic-prerogative-in-chicago [https://perma.cc/XF8H-BWJF] (describing 
the difficult path the bill faces). 
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delegation.302 The equitable development of affordable housing remains a 
spark plug in Chicago politics, and prerogative persists.303 
 
*          *          * 
 
Because legislators have not shown themselves eager to curb their own 
prerogative, judicial intervention merits consideration as an alternative 
solution. But ultimately, judicial intervention often is most effective as a 
temporary fix and external catalyst for legislative action.304 The challenge is 
to craft a lawsuit that not only provides immediate relief to plaintiffs, but 
also overcomes the legislature’s inertia and spurs the passage of the 
promising legislative solutions discussed above. With this goal in mind, 
which of the legal challenges just reviewed materializes as most promising? 
Individual challenges might prove most useful in setting up systemic 
challenges. A recurring issue of individual challenges is the difficulty of 
holding municipalities liable through Monell claims. Especially when 
prerogative exists as an unwritten tradition, cases in jurisdictions without 
precedent recognizing prerogative as a legislative custom or de facto policy 
can make this a complicated task. As to identifying the best legal theory, the 
cases above suggest no silver bullet exists and that plaintiffs will have to 
make particularized determinations.305 Furthermore, insofar as individual 
 
 302 Illinois House Bill 4484, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/IL/sponsors/HB4484/2019 
[https://perma.cc/SQ95-ZVFD]. Mayor Lightfoot’s City Council floor leader, Alderman Gilbert Villegas, 
has called the proposed legislation a “publicity stunt tailor-made to capitalize on the burgeoning 
corruption scandal that has spread from City Hall and the south suburbs to Springfield.” Fran Spielman, 
Lightfoot Gets Unlikely Assist with Potential End-Run Around City Council on Aldermanic Prerogative, 
CHI. SUN-TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020, 4:36 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/city-
hall/2020/2/6/21127063/aldermanic-prerogative-chicago-city-council-zoning-wards-deanne-mazzochi-
lightfoot [https://perma.cc/UN2C-4AX4]. 
 303 See, e.g., As Lightfoot Touts Poverty Initiative, Ideas from People Actually Experiencing Poverty 
Were Left Out, Groups Say, CHI. COAL. FOR HOMELESS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www. 
chicagohomeless.org/as-lightfoot-touts-poverty-initiative-ideas-from-people-actually-experiencing-
poverty-were-left-out-groups-say [https://perma.cc/NCL7-PCXF]; Jay Koziarz, Will New Legislation Fix 
Chicago’s Affordable Housing Crisis, or Stymie Development?, CURBED CHI. (Dec. 12, 2019, 3:14 PM), 
https://chicago.curbed.com/2019/12/12/21011062/affordable-housing-development-for-all-ordinance 
[https://perma.cc/PY8S-82NB]; Joe Cahill, A Better Remedy for Chicago’s Affordable Housing Shortage, 
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Jan. 21, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/joe-cahill-
business/better-remedy-chicagos-affordable-housing-shortage [https://perma.cc/H9YD-A3HY]. 
 304 Cf. Ramsin Canon, Chicago Journal on Aldermanic Privilege, GAPERS BLOCK (July 16, 2009), 
http://gapersblock.com/mechanics/2009/07/16/chicago-journal-on-aldermanic [https://perma.cc/69VM-
678N] (discussing the uneasy balance required between judicial intervention and legislative action). 
 305 Asking, for example, whether there are similarly situated comparators for an equal protection 
claim, a cognizable property interest for a due process claim, or retaliatory grounds for a First Amendment 
claim. 
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litigants challenge prerogative’s segregative impact, successful individual 
challenges unfortunately can only impact one affordable development at a 
time. 
Conversely, systemic challenges have greater potential for sweeping 
change. But this route can be just as, if not more, difficult. One of the major 
issues with pursuing an administrative complaint is that these proceedings 
are wholly controlled by the current presidential Administration, subject to 
its policy priorities.306 The Los Angeles litigation offers an alternative—and 
likely more promising—avenue in state court. ACCE Action based one of its 
claims on state nondelegation doctrine,307 which could also be litigated in 
other municipal contexts. Though the California state court never actually 
decided the case, this nondelegation claim was the only count generalizable 
beyond California since the nondelegation doctrine remains viable at the 
state level.308 Accordingly, opponents of prerogative in other cities might 
consider similarly grounding their claims in nondelegation principles. 
CONCLUSION 
Prerogative’s most pernicious evil is its capacity to perpetuate 
segregation. But uprooting regimes of prerogative is an uphill battle, 
especially when these regimes date back decades and exist as unwritten 
traditions. City councils, of their own accord, are loath to curtail their own 
power. Although one might hope that connecting prerogative to segregative 
legislator vetoes would spur change, prerogative’s entrenched, national 
reach suggests that the injustice of segregation is still likely insufficient for 
internally motivated change. Legislators, concerned with their own 
reelection, will hesitate to depart from the status quo. Accordingly, even 
when a local legislative body agrees on the need for equitably located 
affordable housing, majoritarian beliefs about structural power and 
prerogative swallow the housing agenda. Fortunately, as a growing number 
of cases suggest, counter-majoritarianism expressed through judicial 
 
 306 For example, the Trump Administration promulgated a rule reinterpreting the Fair Housing Act’s 
disparate impact theory of liability, thereby making the law more hostile to plaintiffs. Kriston Capps, With 
Rule Changes, Trump Launches ‘an Attack on Fair Housing From All Sides’, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB 
(Sep. 10, 2020, 12:09 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-09-09/how-hud-rewrote-
the-rules-on-fair-housing [https://perma.cc/6TMQ-2QQ2]. While Baltimore’s administrative complaint 
led to a successful outcome for fair housing advocates, that dispute was filed and decided during the 
Obama Administration; CAFHA filed its complaint in 2018 and its outcome remains uncertain. 
 307 See ACCE Action Complaint, supra note 261, at 42–43. 
 308 See Edward H. Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial Control and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 34 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 27, 30–34 (2018) (noting that “even if the doctrine is essentially silent at the federal 
level . . . it continues to thrive in many states”). 
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intervention may provide an alternative avenue to spur legislative action that 
meaningfully constrains prerogative. 
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